Prioritize user privacy and data security in your app. Discuss best practices for data handling, user consent, and security measures to protect user information.

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Sign in with Apple fails with ASAuthorizationError.canceled (1001) / "Sign Up Not Completed" — server-side, all config verified
Our app's Sign in with Apple never completes. Apple's create-account sheet renders fully (name + share/hide-my-email step), then the final server submit fails and shows the "Sign Up Not Completed" sheet. The authorization callback returns ASAuthorizationError.canceled (1001) with no userInfo — even though the user did not cancel. Reproduced on multiple physical devices and multiple Apple IDs (all with 2FA), on iOS 26.5.1, since our first build. Team ID: 24XS837728 App ID: C54N9Q226H (bundle com.sucsessmaperrs.careerAssessmentApp) Verified on our side: com.apple.developer.applesignin = [Default] present in the distribution build (codesign -d --entitlements); embedded profile is the explicit App Store profile for the App ID (not wildcard). App ID has Sign in with Apple enabled as a primary App ID; capability deleted + recreated via the App Store Connect API today, no change. Firebase consumes the identity token; the failure is in Apple's UI before our code runs. App Store Connect agreements are clean. Key isolating fact: the same Apple ID on the same device completes a first-time Sign in with Apple sign-up in other third-party apps — only ours fails. So the cause appears scoped to our App ID / team on Apple's side, not the device, the Apple ID, 2FA, or our client code. This matches the widespread server-side "Sign Up Not Completed" failure in thread 675756 — same signature: multiple devices/Apple IDs, no console error, the failure delegate surfacing only as "cancel", newly created apps affected, even Apple's own sample app failing — which Apple ultimately resolved server-side (with a recurrence reported June 2025). Note this is the native ASAuthorizationController flow, not the REST/web flow, so the query-parameter percent-encoding fix from thread 122458 does not apply here. Could an Apple engineer check the server-side Sign in with Apple / account-association state for App ID C54N9Q226H (Team 24XS837728)? Happy to provide a screen recording or sysdiagnose.
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Verifying a stored file-based Keychain trusted-application requirement
I'm evaluating a macOS file-based Keychain ACL that should authorize one application identity, defined by an intended code-signing requirement. The application is a shared Python interpreter; I understand that trusting it does not restrict access to an individual script. I read the related Apple Developer Forums discussion, which explains that complete ACL introspection is not supported and that the stored trusted-application code-signing requirement is accessible through SPI rather than public API. My narrower question is whether there is a supported verification operation that does not require exposing that requirement: Given a SecTrustedApplicationRef obtained through SecACLCopyContents, can a public API establish that its stored caller-matching requirement is no broader than the intended application requirement? Confirming that the intended application is accepted would establish only that it matches, not that additional application identities are excluded. I also don't want to assume that CFEqual against a newly created reference, matching paths, or matching SecTrustedApplicationCopyData results proves equivalent authorization. Apple's documentation describes the CopyData result as opaque. If this comparison is unsupported, what documented provisioning or operating-system enforcement guarantees should an application rely on instead? Is controlled provisioning the intended boundary, or is a different supported Keychain design appropriate? Most importantly, if verifying the exact trusted-application restriction isn't supported, what is Apple's recommended secure approach for allowing a local Python trading application to retrieve Keychain credentials without granting access to every script using the same Python interpreter? A fake-only example using a disposable test Keychain and synthetic generic-password item has been prepared but has not been built or run because full Xcode was unavailable. This is an API-contract question; no runtime failure or ACL attack is claimed, and no assumption is made that published source exactly matches the installed framework.
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Is com.apple.security.device.serial supported for new Mac App Store updates?
I’m preparing an update to a native macOS serial logger already distributed through the Mac App Store. The app uses IOSerialBSDClient to enumerate serial ports, opens the selected /dev/cu.* device with open(O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY | O_NONBLOCK), and configures it with termios. On macOS 27.2, open() returns EPERM with App Sandbox enabled and the USB and Bluetooth entitlements present. The same port opens successfully from a process without App Sandbox. I reproduced this with several adapters. Apple’s archived Entitlement Key Reference lists com.apple.security.device.serial and describes adding it manually: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Miscellaneous/Reference/EntitlementKeyReference/Chapters/EnablingAppSandbox.html The macOS 27.2 App Sandbox profile still contains a rule for this entitlement, but I couldn’t find it in the current entitlement documentation or in Xcode 27.2’s Signing & Capabilities editor. Is adding com.apple.security.device.serial manually to the app’s signed entitlements still the supported approach for new Mac App Store updates? Does it require separate approval or provisioning authorization? If this entitlement is no longer supported for Mac App Store submissions, what does Apple recommend for accessing system-provided BSD serial ports with App Sandbox enabled? The app needs to work with ports exposed by both system and third-party drivers and configure them through termios. Would a temporary file access exception for /dev/ be appropriate for this use case?
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SFAuthorizationPluginView returns nil at the active-session lock screen (screensaver unlock), non-MDM
What we're trying to do We ship a Developer-ID authorization plugin (a SecurityAgent AuthorizationPlugin bundle exporting AuthorizationPluginCreate, hosting an SFAuthorizationPluginView subclass) that presents custom credential + MFA UI at macOS authentication surfaces — the Jamf Connect / NoMAD / XCreds pattern. This works correctly at the login window (system.login.console). We now want the same custom UI at the active-session lock screen (screensaver unlock), so a managed user can satisfy an MFA step on unlock — without MDM. We understand Platform SSO is the MDM-based path; we're specifically asking about the non-MDM AuthorizationPlugin path, which Cisco Duo and RSA appear to ship on macOS 14/15. Environment macOS Sonoma 14.8.7 and Sequoia 15.7.7 / 15.7.9, Apple Silicon (arm64). Non-MDM. Standard Developer ID distribution, no configuration profiles. Plugin bundle: Developer ID Application + Hardened Runtime (flags=runtime), satisfies its DR, notarized. Bundle has an empty NSPrincipalClass and no NSMainNibFile; construction follows the NameAndPassword DTS sample exactly (alloc the SFAuthorizationPluginView subclass via -initWithCallbacks:andEngineRef: in MechanismInvoke, then -displayView). Reproduction Install the plugin into /Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins/. Define a custom right (class = evaluate-mechanisms, mechanisms = [ OurPlugin:invoke ]) — we do not replace the screensaver rule. Append that right to the existing rule, keeping use-login-window-ui: system.login.screensaver (class = rule): rule = [ use-login-window-ui, com.example.screensaver-mfa ] (This "append after use-login-window-ui" arming matches what Cisco Duo's installer does — native password unlock runs first, then the appended mechanism runs in the post-password phase.) Lock, then unlock. What we observe Our mechanism is invoked at unlock (MechanismInvoke runs — so the arming is correct; the modern path otherwise never invokes third-party plugins). But inside MechanismInvoke, on the main thread, in SecurityAgentHelper-arm64: host check: AgentPluginViewHelper = PRESENT // we're in the SecurityAgent GUI host probe: callbacks->version = 4, GetHintValue = <ptr> // engine callbacks, unmodified probe: authorize-right PRESENT rc=0 val=system.login.screensaver presenter alloc'd p = 0x0 (nil = 1) // init returns nil -[SFAuthorizationPluginView initWithCallbacks:andEngineRef:] returns nil. Every downstream symptom we'd chased earlier (black screen, spinner, "ViewBridge … Connection invalid") is just a consequence of there being no view object. What we've ruled out Tracing the construction path (-initWithCallbacks:andEngineRef: → -loadPlugin → [AgentPluginViewHelper loadPluginForRight:engineRef:pluginView:]), we've eliminated: Host process — AgentPluginViewHelper is present; we're in SecurityAgent, not authorizationhost (our UI mechanism is non-privileged). The authorize-right hint — present and correct (system.login.screensaver), read straight through callbacks->GetHintValue. Callbacks / engineRef — valid, version == 4, passed through unmodified (same pointer the engine handed us). The nib — no NSMainNibFile set. The right→product mapping — the right maps to the builtin product, whose plugin object constructs unconditionally. That leaves the display_view re-host step, which appears bound to whether this SecurityAgent instance currently has a live, connection-accepting view-hosting session. Our hypothesis: use-login-window-ui completes the native unlock and tears down its view-hosting session, so our appended mechanism runs after teardown → no live host for display_view → the builtin display mechanism's init fails → SFAuthorizationPluginView init returns nil. The experiment that should have fixed it — but didn't The vendor that ships this (Duo) brackets its non-privileged GUI mechanism with a leading privileged mechanism (and a trailing one). A privileged mechanism runs in authorizationhost; we hypothesized the privileged→non-privileged transition makes authd re-activate SecurityAgent and stand up a fresh view-hosting session before the GUI mechanism runs. We mirrored exactly that: [ OurPlugin:precheck,privileged, OurPlugin:invoke, OurPlugin:complete,privileged ] where precheck/complete are no-op privileged mechanisms that just SetResult(allow). The logs confirm the transition happened: precheck ran in authorizationhosthelper, then invoke ran in a freshly spawned SecurityAgentHelper process (so SecurityAgent did re-activate), with AgentPluginViewHelper present and the hint correct — yet SFAuthorizationPluginView init still returned nil. So replicating the vendor's authorizationdb structure is not sufficient. The remaining difference is either an OS precondition that simply isn't met during a locked-session unlock (the agent isn't accepting view-hosting connections in that context), or something in the vendor's bundle/build (entitlements, embedded XPC/frameworks) rather than the authdb wiring. Questions Is presenting a custom SFAuthorizationPluginView at the active-session lock screen a supported scenario for a non-MDM Developer-ID authorization plugin on macOS 14/15? If yes — what is the supported way to ensure a live view-hosting session exists for a mechanism appended to system.login.screensaver after use-login-window-ui? Is the leading-privileged-mechanism pattern intended, or is there a documented right/API we should use? If SFAuthorizationPluginView init returning nil in this context is expected, please confirm and point us to the sanctioned alternative for custom credential UI at screensaver unlock without MDM. Does any of this differ on Managed vs. non-Managed devices, or depend on SIP / FileVault / Secure Enclave state? References Forums 110667 — use-login-window-ui blocks third-party plugins; legacy path invokes them ("not a bug"). Forums 744211, 771114 — SFAuthorizationPluginView / ViewBridge / viewForType: never called at the lock screen on macOS 15. Feedback FB13238136, FB13128730 — third-party plugin at the lock shield; Data-Protection keychain from screensaver context. Sample code: NameAndPassword — our construction shape matches it exactly. I can provide a minimal reproducer bundle and a sysdiagnose + unified-log capture around a failed unlock on request.
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Empty initiatorOrigin in Redirect SSO extension authorization options on macOS 27
In our macOS Redirect SSO extension, initiatorOrigin is empty in the authorization options received in beginAuthorization(with:). The corresponding AppSSOAgent log shows: localhost AppSSOAgent[55733]: (AppSSOUI) [com.apple.AppSSO:SOAgent] -[SOAgent beginAuthorizationWithRequestParameters:completion:] { AuthorizationOptions = { initiatingAction = 0; initiatorOrigin = ""; path = ""; userActionInitiated = 1; };Is this expected behavior for certain SSO requests, or could this indicate an issue in macOS 27?
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Empty initiatorOrigin in Redirect SSO extension authorization options on macOS 27
We are developing a macOS Redirect SSO extension and observing an empty initiatorOrigin in the authorization options received in beginAuthorization(with:). The corresponding AppSSOAgent log shows: localhost AppSSOAgent[55733]: (AppSSOUI) [com.apple.AppSSO:SOAgent] -[SOAgent beginAuthorizationWithRequestParameters:completion:] { AuthorizationOptions = { initiatingAction = 0; initiatorOrigin = ""; path = ""; userActionInitiated = 1; };Is this expected behavior for certain SSO requests, or could this indicate an issue in macOS 27?
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Core Motion timing between Apple Watch and iPhone under required reason 35F9.1
We are developing an Apple Watch and iPhone training app and would like guidance on the required-reason API requirements for sharing a timing relationship between the two apps. On Apple Watch, we record Core Motion samples and read ProcessInfo.processInfo.systemUptime when each sample callback arrives. The paired iPhone uses timing information to analyze sample ordering and freshness. The two values relevant to this question are: Measurement timestamp: CMLogItem.timestamp associated with the Core Motion sample on Apple Watch. Callback observation time: systemUptime read by the Watch app when it receives that sample’s callback. The proposed interval is the callback observation time minus the measurement timestamp, calculated on the Watch. Both endpoints are on the Watch. The iPhone is the intended recipient of the interval; its receipt time is not an endpoint of this calculation. For illustration only, synthetic values of 1,000.000 seconds for the measurement timestamp and 1,000.020 seconds for the callback observation time would produce a proposed interval of 0.020 seconds. These are not real measurements. This arithmetic example does not establish clock compatibility or permission to transmit the result. Apple’s documentation describes CMLogItem.timestamp as seconds since device boot. The System Boot Time required-reason API list includes systemUptime and mach_absolute_time(). Reason 35F9.1 permits certain elapsed-time measurements and includes an exception for elapsed time between events that occurred within the app. Our questions are: Is CMLogItem.timestamp itself covered by the System Boot Time required-reason API category? We do not see this property explicitly included in the published list. Under reason 35F9.1, may the interval between a Core Motion measurement timestamp and the app’s callback observation time be sent from Apple Watch to its paired iPhone for analysis? Specifically, does it qualify for the exception for elapsed time between events that occurred within the app, given that the measurement time comes from Core Motion? If not, is there an approved way to represent this timing relationship while preserving sample ordering and freshness analysis? Which timing information may be transferred, and which approved reason, if any, applies? We are not reporting an Apple API malfunction. We are asking how to implement this use in accordance with the privacy requirements. Our focused local Xcode sample uses synthetic values only. It does not collect real motion data or transmit data between devices.
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Developed an app and run it, now I see autofill (app name) in activity monitor. Please help!
Developed an app and run it, now I see Autofill (app name) in activity monitor. Please help! I am using opensource libraries. My other developed apps does not show autofill (app name) and it uses the same libs. The differences with the 2 is that the one with the problem uses: assimp, and freetype 2. Is this a security risk? I am thinking maybe if i run this app in sudo mode it will autofill and reveal my password to hackers. What is the best way to mitigate this?
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ATT iOS 27.2 EU – Does the 12-month reprompt interval include decisions made before iOS 27.2?
Hello, We are investigating the new annual ATT reprompting behavior introduced in iOS 27.2 for EU users. Apple's documentation states that developers can request ATT authorization again one year after the user's previous choice. However, we would like to clarify how this applies to existing ATT decisions made before iOS 27.2. Questions Previous ATT decisions older than 12 months If a user denied ATT permission in March 2025 on an earlier iOS version and upgrades to iOS 27.2 in November 2026, can the app immediately display the ATT prompt again? Previous ATT decisions less than 12 months old If a user denied ATT permission in June 2026, will the next ATT prompt become available in June 2027, or does the 12-month period start from the installation of iOS 27.2? Historical ATT decision timestamps Does iOS maintain the original timestamp of ATT decisions made on previous iOS versions, or does the new annual reprompting mechanism only track decisions recorded from iOS 27.2 onwards? Reprompt eligibility API Is there any public API that allows developers to determine whether a user is eligible for an ATT reprompt, without actually attempting to display it? Context This is particularly important for existing applications and Consent Management Platforms (CMPs), where we need to coordinate ATT authorization with GDPR consent flows. Understanding whether the 12-month interval applies retroactively to existing ATT decisions would help us implement the new behavior correctly without unnecessarily prompting users or disrupting existing consent flows. Thank you for your clarification
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Authentication code for mobile phone not received
I am trying to fix an expired TestFlight build, which requires an update. However, when I attempt to log in to my developer account, I get stuck at the mobile phone authentication step. Although I have entered the correct phone number, the verification code never arrives on my device—even after multiple attempts—and the phone-based authentication option itself is not working. What should I do?
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Unexpected Core Foundation attribute types when inspecting an existing Secure Enclave-associated Keychain key on macOS
Hello Apple Developer community, I'm investigating an unexpected metadata representation returned by Apple's Security framework while inspecting an existing Secure Enclave-associated Keychain item on macOS. A read-only inspection using SecItemCopyMatching returns one matching key record with a successful status, a Secure Enclave token identifier (com.apple.setoken), and a 256-bit key size. However, direct Core Foundation type inspection reports: kSecAttrKeyType: CFNumber kSecAttrKeyClass: CFNumber kSecAttrSynchronizable: CFNumber The raw Core Foundation observations and bridged observations agree. Our current validator rejects these unexpected types and returns UNSUPPORTED_OR_INCOMPLETE_METADATA. We have deliberately stopped further key operations pending clarification. Questions: Can these CFNumber values legitimately appear in a dictionary returned by SecItemCopyMatching for Secure Enclave-associated key items on macOS? What returned value types should be expected for these three attributes, and are they dependent on the query or Keychain implementation? Is there an Apple-recommended way to normalize or validate these attributes without incorrectly accepting incompatible metadata? How should an application distinguish an existing Secure Enclave-backed key from an incomplete or unsupported Keychain record without performing a private-key operation? Are there relevant Security framework documentation references or known implementation differences we should consult? Our aim is to validate the existing record safely without regenerating, deleting, or using the private key. Thank you for your guidance.
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Can macOS restrict a signing key to one exact build of a system daemon?
Hi Apple Developer Technical Support, We have a locally signed macOS system daemon that an administrator starts manually. It needs to use a dedicated P-256 signing key in a file-based keychain. We want macOS to let only the exact approved build use that key, without a prompt. A different build signed with the same certificate should be denied. Apple’s published Security source shows that the keychain can identify some callers by their code directory hash (cdhash). Is setting a key’s partition list to that exact hash a supported way to enforce this restriction for a system daemon? If so, which macOS versions support it, and what API or Apple tool should we use to configure it? After setup, how can we verify that the intended key has the exact restriction in place, including whether any broader rule allows another process to sign with the key, export it, or change its access rules? If macOS doesn’t offer a supported way to set and verify this restriction, please confirm that limitation.
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Apple Music off-device authorization for Android TV / WebOS — supported integration and client registration
Hello, I am developing an application that integrates with Apple Music to provide a personalized music video experience for Apple Music subscribers. We are working on support for many devices like Android TV / Google TV / WebOS / etc. and would like to implement an authorization experience suitable for a television, where entering account credentials with a remote control is cumbersome. Intended authorization flow We would like to implement the following experience: The application on the TV displays a QR code or short activation code. The user scans the QR code with their phone and opens an Apple-hosted authentication and authorization page. The user signs in to their Apple Account if necessary and approves Apple Music access for the application on the TV. The TV application receives or retrieves the resulting authorization and can use it for the supported Apple Music functionality. The objective is for the TV application itself to be authorized following approval on the phone, with no need to enter the Apple Account credentials on the television. Relevant implementation evidence found on Apple’s website While researching this integration, we examined JavaScript publicly served by link.apple.com. In the following OAuth view bundle, we observed these identifiers: PartnerAuthorizationRequest isOffDeviceOAuth2Flow DEVICE_CODE Source: Apple-hosted OAuth view bundle — oauth-views-OAuth-vue.4db9105e.js In the associated OAuth initializer bundle, we observed properties including: client_id scope response_type Source: Apple-hosted OAuth initializer bundle — oauth-views-OAuthInitializer-vue.23605d03.js These elements suggest that Apple’s authorization interface includes an off-device authorization path associated with partner clients. We understand that these implementation details are not public API documentation and do not establish whether this flow is available to third-party developers. We are looking for the officially supported integration and enrollment process, if one is available. Clarification requested 1. Availability for third-party TV applications Does Apple offer a supported Apple Music authorization flow of this kind for third-party applications running on non-Apple devices? If the observed flow is limited to certain integrations or partners, what are the eligibility requirements for obtaining access? 2. Client registration and account configuration What is the official process for registering or obtaining a client_id authorized to use this flow? We have reviewed the standard MusicKit configuration involving Media IDs, Media Services keys, App Services and Capability Requests, but have not identified the configuration or application process for off-device authorization. Could you clarify whether this requires: A standard MusicKit Media ID and Media Services key; An additional service configuration or managed capability request in the Apple Developer account; A separate OAuth client registration; Or approval through an Apple Music partner program? 3. Supported integration documentation If this integration is available, where can we obtain the documentation or SDK covering: The required client configuration, request parameters and permitted scopes; Creation of the authorization request and the QR code or activation link; The mechanism by which the TV checks for completion or receives the result; The resulting token type, its intended use, and its expiration or reauthorization requirements? In particular, we would appreciate clarification on whether the resulting authorization provides a Music User Token usable by the TV application, or another token that requires a documented exchange. 4. Apple Music access on the authorized TV Which Apple Music APIs or SDKs can consume the resulting authorization? We would like to confirm its supported use with Apple Music API and MusicKit for Android, including any separate requirements for playback on the TV. Our intended design is for authorization to be issued for the TV application, rather than transferring a Music User Token issued for the phone. If this access is handled outside the standard MusicKit developer workflow, could you please identify the applicable program and enrollment process, or who to route this request to the Apple Music team responsible for partner authorization and connected-device integrations? Thank you for helping us identify the supported path for this integration. Louis
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Account Membership Expired / Team ID DNQ8PB6F6V Unreachable Due to Deprecated Profile Conflict
Apple Developer Account — Access & Subscription Issue Hello Apple Developer Support, I am writing to resolve a critical access and subscription issue with my Apple Developer account. My Apple ID (lich666black@gmail.com, Person ID: 1669634243, Developer ID: L2B6257ZS2) is the Account Holder for my organization, Khasanshin Rinat Ildarovich, IP (Team ID: DNQ8PB6F6V, App Store Connect Legal Entity ID: 90331734). Current Blocking State In App Store Connect, the organization team DNQ8PB6F6V shows that the membership has expired and prompts me to accept the updated Apple Developer Program License Agreement on the Apple Developer website. However, when I log into developer.apple.com/account, the portal backend returns an empty teams array (teams: []) with isAgentOfAnyActiveTeam: false, and defaults my web session to an old duplicate profile ("Rinat khasanshin", marked as Deprecated in ASC). Because of this, the web portal hides my organization team and only displays the "Enroll today" button. When I try to use it, the system blocks me with the error: "Your Apple Account is already associated with the Account Holder of a membership." Additionally, I cannot use the native macOS Apple Developer app to resolve this, because the app requires a newer version of macOS than what is currently running on my Mac. Request Could you please assist in: Unlinking or merging the deprecated profile; Re-syncing my active organization team (DNQ8PB6F6V); Updating the membership status so I can properly access the portal and sign the updated agreement? Thank you for your help.
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Repeated login Keychain prompts and securityd crash after app upgrade on macOS 26.6.x
Overview We are investigating repeated "login" Keychain prompts affecting our macOS application on macOS 26.6.x. The issue appears after upgrading an existing installation. A clean uninstall/reinstall of the same version resolves it. Changing the affected Keychain item's Access Control from "Confirm before allowing access" to explicitly allowing our application/process also stops the prompts. On one affected machine, Apple Support observed a securityd crash followed by: SecKeyCreateSignature failed CSSMERR_DL_INVALID_DB_HANDLE Our code uses some legacy SecKeychain* APIs, so we are currently investigating whether this is related. Questions Were there any changes in macOS 26.6.x around securityd, Keychain ACL handling, or legacy SecKeychain* APIs that could explain this? Could an existing Keychain ACL become stale after an application upgrade, even when both versions are signed with the same Developer ID?
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Secure Enclave: Supporting Signing-Only, Key-Agreement-Only, and Dual-Purpose Keys
Hello everyone, I'm trying to understand the actual limitations of the Secure Enclave (SEP) regarding cryptographic key capabilities, and more specifically how to generate and store the following key types in the keychain: Sign only: The key can only be used for digital signatures. Key agreement only: The key can only be used for key agreement operations. All operations: The key can be used for both signing and key agreement. I've noticed some apparent differences between Apple's Security framework and CryptoKit, and I'm trying to understand whether these differences reflect actual SEP limitations or simply framework-level restrictions. 1. Security framework: dual purpose keys I'm currently using SecKeyCreateRandomKey to generate Secure Enclave-backed keys. Here is the relevant code: NSDictionary *privateAttributes = @{ (__bridge id)kSecAttrIsPermanent : @YES, (__bridge id)kSecAttrAccessControl : ..., (__bridge id)kSecAttrApplicationTag : ..., // key agreement only (__bridge id)kSecAttrCanSign: @NO, (__bridge id)kSecAttrCanDerive: @YES }; NSMutableDictionary *attributes = [ @{ (__bridge id)kSecAttrKeyType : (__bridge id)kSecAttrKeyTypeECSECPrimeRandom, (__bridge id)kSecAttrTokenID : (__bridge id)kSecAttrTokenIDSecureEnclave, (__bridge id)kSecAttrKeySizeInBits : @256, (__bridge id)kSecPrivateKeyAttrs : privateAttributes } mutableCopy ]; CFErrorRef generationError = nullptr; SecKeyRef privateKey = SecKeyCreateRandomKey( (__bridge CFDictionaryRef)attributes, &generationError );However, when experimenting with these attributes, I encountered the following error: SecKeyCreateRandomKey failed: Error Domain=NSOSStatusErrorDomain Code=-50 "Failed to generate keypair" Underlying error: Error Domain=CryptoTokenKit Code=-8 "sepkey: sign requires '1' value when present"Using signing-only attributes results in the same kind of error. This makes me wonder whether the Security framework actually allows generating (and adding entries in the keyChain) only keys with both capabilities enabled. It is possible to create siging only key or key agreement only key with Security framework? 2. CryptoKit: Separate key types On the other hand, CryptoKit seems to expose two distinct Secure Enclave key types: P256.SecureEnclave.Signing.PrivateKey P256.SecureEnclave.KeyAgreement.PrivateKeyFrom the API design, it appears that CryptoKit only allows creating keys dedicated to one operation or the other. For example, a Signing.PrivateKey cannot be used for key agreement, and a KeyAgreement.PrivateKey cannot be used for signing. Is it possible to create both capabilities keys with CryptoKit framework? 3. Actual Secure Enclave limitations What are the actual cryptographic capability limitations imposed by the SEP itself? I'd particularly like to understand which restrictions originate from: The Secure Enclave hardware. Security and CryptoKit frameworks. Is there a documented way to generate and store in the keychain: A signing-only Secure Enclave key? A key-agreement-only Secure Enclave key? A Secure Enclave key supporting both operations? Thanks in advance, Idopte
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Platform SSO OpenID and Keychain after a password reset
Hi, I'm trying to understand how the new OpenID authentication in macOS 27 behaves after a user resets their password in the identity provider. I understand that Microsoft Entra ID does not currently support the new OpenID Platform SSO flow in macOS 27. I'm using Entra ID only as an example here, my question is about the general macOS behavior and should apply equally to other identity providers such as Okta, Google Workspace, or any other IdP that implements the required Platform SSO 2.0 / OpenID support. Example: Mac is configured with Platform SSO and AuthenticationMethod = OpenID FileVault is enabled the user already has an existing local account and login Keychain the user resets their IdP password remotely they no longer remember the old local Mac password at the next Mac login they authenticate successfully using the new OpenID web login What happens next? If AllowWebLoginPasswordSync is enabled, I understand that macOS can synchronize the new IdP password to the local Mac account. My main question is what happens to the existing Keychain. Does macOS preserve the existing login.keychain and its contents, or can the user lose access to it because the old local password is no longer known? I'm also interested in what happens to things that depend on the existing Keychain, for example: saved application credentials certificates and private keys Wi-Fi credentials Apple Account / iCloud sign-in state And how does Platform SSO 2.0 Key Service fit into this? Apple documentation says that Key Service can unlock the user's key bag before login. Does that also help preserve access to the existing login Keychain when the old local password is no longer available? In practical terms, I'm trying to understand whether macOS 27 finally supports this workflow without losing user data or credentials: User forgets the Mac password → resets their IdP password → signs in through OpenID → continues using the same Mac profile and Keychain normally. Thanks :)
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Adopting Trust Insights in a global app: what works, what I measured, and what I could not find
I have been working through what it would take for a real app, say a bank's, to adopt Trust Insights in a way that works for customers around the world, using only what has been published so far: session 379, the framework documentation and the support article. While the client side works well, there is information a production app needs that I could not find. So I am posting this for two reasons. Some of what I learned may save you time, and since the rest needs an answer from Apple, I would like to have those questions answered in one place. If you would like to see working code, the sample project I used keeps all of the API in one file. What I measured Adding the Trust Insights capability in Xcode was all I needed to get the whole flow running on a device: the permission alert, the evaluation and the report. The simulator returns .unavailable, so you will need a device to test any of this. There are two switches to keep in mind, the system one at Settings > Privacy & Security > Impersonation Risk Detection, and one for each app underneath it. This is what I got from authorizationStatus(for:) in a development build: With the setting turned off, for the app or for everything, it returned .denied right away, even though the support article says changes might take up to 24 hours. It was still .denied 24 hours later. When I turned the setting back on, it returned .authorized right away. After deleting and reinstalling the app it returned .denied, and did not go back to .notDetermined. So while the documentation describes .denied as the person refusing permission, in practice it also covers the setting being off, and you should plan for customers who will never see your permission alert. Since I could not find an API that opens that page in Settings, all you can do is tell them where it is, and you should call it Impersonation Risk Detection because that is the name they will see there. What I would do today Treat having no evaluation as a normal path. Between permissions, availability, the network and server errors, some of your customers will not get a result, and in all of those cases your existing checks should decide and the transaction should carry on as it did before. Start the evaluation early. The session says it takes a couple of seconds and the documentation says several, so I start it when the screen appears, and a production app should also stop waiting after a deadline of its own. An evaluation that comes back too late still has to be reported, as .notUsedError. Call reportConsumption once for every evaluation, on every path, including a transaction the person cancels (.notUsedNotNeeded). The documentation says that skipping it may result in rate limiting or losing access to the service, so this is not something to leave for later. Until the server side details are available, only use the result to add friction. A decision made in the app can be changed by anyone who can change the app, which does not matter for a warning, but it does matter if unknown lets someone skip a check. Keep the eventID with your transaction records, even if you have no way of using it yet, because that is what the documentation says identifies the evaluation when fraud is discovered later. If your fraud team wants to see numbers before anything changes for customers, .usedEvaluationOnly is the documented way to report an evaluation that had no effect on a decision. For UI work, put your decision behind a type of your own and drive the warning screens from a debug switch, because there is no way to create the conditions for a medium or a high on purpose. What I could not find: the information we need from Apple These are the questions I would like answered, along with what each one means for you until they are. The session says values and errors can be overridden with launch arguments, and refers to the documentation for the list. Where can we find that list? Until then, the medium, high and error paths can only be tested by reading the code, which is not a comfortable place to be for a flow that holds someone's money. Which devices and regions are supported, and what determines the region that applies to a device? The documentation for .unavailable mentions both without listing them, so if your app has customers around the world, you cannot yet tell your support team who should be getting this, and .unavailable on its own will not tell you why. What status should an app expect on a phone where the setting has never been changed, and can it show the permission alert in that state? If the answer is .denied, your app cannot ask until the customer has found the setting on their own, which would change how you plan for adoption. What does the 24 hour delay apply to, and do evaluations behave differently during it? Because the status changes immediately, at least in development, I cannot tell you what to expect in production. Which environment do TestFlight, Ad Hoc and Enterprise builds use? The session only separates development (sandbox) from the App Store (production), so you cannot be sure how much your beta testing tells you about production. What are the rate limits, and is there guidance for rolling this out to a large installed base, as there is for App Attest? The documentation says a limit can apply to the app on one device or across all devices. For now I would ramp up slowly, and treat rateLimitExceeded as having no evaluation. What period of activity does an evaluation reflect, and how long does the result stay meaningful? Because I have to start it early, I do not know how much a result from when the screen appeared says about what is happening when the person taps Confirm a few minutes later. How does a server verify signedPayload? I could not find the keys or the payload schema. Until that is available, using a result to reduce friction (.usedReducedFriction) cannot be done safely. Where is the API for reporting fraud after the fact documented, and can it be used without a verified business on Apple Business Register? The session refers to the documentation for this, and also to Partner Data Services, which I could not find described anywhere public. I have filed all of this as a documentation request, FB25453150, which also covers a few smaller items like language support and privacy declarations. I will update this thread as I learn more, and if you have measured something different from what I describe here, please post it, because that would help everyone working on this. S.BECK - 7strikes.dev
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Using Cryptokit.SecureEnclave API from a Launch Daemon
We are interested in using a hardware-bound key in a launch daemon. In a previous post, Quinn explicitly told me this is not possible to use an SE keypair outside of the system context and my reading of the Apple documentation also supports that. That said, we have gotten the following key-creation and persistence flow to work, so we have some questions as to how this fits in with the above. (1) In a launch daemon (running thus as root), we do: let key = SecureEnclave.P256.Signing.PrivateKey() (2) We then use key.dataRepresentation to store a reference to the key in the system keychain as a kSecClassGenericPassword. (3) When we want to use the key, we fetch the data representation from system keychain and we "rehydrate" the key using: SecureEnclave.P256.Signing.PrivateKey(dataRepresentation: data) (4) We then use the output of the above to sign whatever we want. My questions: in the above flow, are we actually getting a hardware-bound key from the Secure Enclave or is this working because it's actually defaulting to a non-hardware-backed key? if it is an SE key, is it that the Apple documentation stating that you can only use the SE with the Data Protection Keychain in the user context is outdated (or wrong)? does the above work, but is not an approach sanctioned by Apple? Any feedback on this would be greatly appreciated.
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Sign in with Apple shows old app name (“Pet Companion”) after renaming to PawAide — all identifiers updated
Our app’s Sign in with Apple sheet still says “Create an account for Pet Companion,” but the app was renamed to PawAide, and every setting we control has been updated: Primary App ID (app.replit.petcompanion): description is “PawAide,” set as the Primary App ID for Sign in with Apple, no other grouped App IDs Services ID (web flow): description is “PawAide,” linked to the primary App ID above App Store Connect: app name is “PawAide” (English U.S., our only localization), and the app is live on the App Store under that name These changes were made over 11 days ago. I have revoked the app under Settings → Sign in with Apple and retested on new TestFlight builds. The old name still appears in both the native iOS sheet and the web flow. Sign-in itself works fine; only the display name is wrong. Developer Support suggested checking these same identifiers, which are all already correct. Has anyone seen the Sign in with Apple display name stay stuck like this? Is there a way to get the cached name refreshed on Apple’s side? Support case: 103007748183 Thanks for any help!
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Sign in with Apple fails with ASAuthorizationError.canceled (1001) / "Sign Up Not Completed" — server-side, all config verified
Our app's Sign in with Apple never completes. Apple's create-account sheet renders fully (name + share/hide-my-email step), then the final server submit fails and shows the "Sign Up Not Completed" sheet. The authorization callback returns ASAuthorizationError.canceled (1001) with no userInfo — even though the user did not cancel. Reproduced on multiple physical devices and multiple Apple IDs (all with 2FA), on iOS 26.5.1, since our first build. Team ID: 24XS837728 App ID: C54N9Q226H (bundle com.sucsessmaperrs.careerAssessmentApp) Verified on our side: com.apple.developer.applesignin = [Default] present in the distribution build (codesign -d --entitlements); embedded profile is the explicit App Store profile for the App ID (not wildcard). App ID has Sign in with Apple enabled as a primary App ID; capability deleted + recreated via the App Store Connect API today, no change. Firebase consumes the identity token; the failure is in Apple's UI before our code runs. App Store Connect agreements are clean. Key isolating fact: the same Apple ID on the same device completes a first-time Sign in with Apple sign-up in other third-party apps — only ours fails. So the cause appears scoped to our App ID / team on Apple's side, not the device, the Apple ID, 2FA, or our client code. This matches the widespread server-side "Sign Up Not Completed" failure in thread 675756 — same signature: multiple devices/Apple IDs, no console error, the failure delegate surfacing only as "cancel", newly created apps affected, even Apple's own sample app failing — which Apple ultimately resolved server-side (with a recurrence reported June 2025). Note this is the native ASAuthorizationController flow, not the REST/web flow, so the query-parameter percent-encoding fix from thread 122458 does not apply here. Could an Apple engineer check the server-side Sign in with Apple / account-association state for App ID C54N9Q226H (Team 24XS837728)? Happy to provide a screen recording or sysdiagnose.
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Verifying a stored file-based Keychain trusted-application requirement
I'm evaluating a macOS file-based Keychain ACL that should authorize one application identity, defined by an intended code-signing requirement. The application is a shared Python interpreter; I understand that trusting it does not restrict access to an individual script. I read the related Apple Developer Forums discussion, which explains that complete ACL introspection is not supported and that the stored trusted-application code-signing requirement is accessible through SPI rather than public API. My narrower question is whether there is a supported verification operation that does not require exposing that requirement: Given a SecTrustedApplicationRef obtained through SecACLCopyContents, can a public API establish that its stored caller-matching requirement is no broader than the intended application requirement? Confirming that the intended application is accepted would establish only that it matches, not that additional application identities are excluded. I also don't want to assume that CFEqual against a newly created reference, matching paths, or matching SecTrustedApplicationCopyData results proves equivalent authorization. Apple's documentation describes the CopyData result as opaque. If this comparison is unsupported, what documented provisioning or operating-system enforcement guarantees should an application rely on instead? Is controlled provisioning the intended boundary, or is a different supported Keychain design appropriate? Most importantly, if verifying the exact trusted-application restriction isn't supported, what is Apple's recommended secure approach for allowing a local Python trading application to retrieve Keychain credentials without granting access to every script using the same Python interpreter? A fake-only example using a disposable test Keychain and synthetic generic-password item has been prepared but has not been built or run because full Xcode was unavailable. This is an API-contract question; no runtime failure or ACL attack is claimed, and no assumption is made that published source exactly matches the installed framework.
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Is com.apple.security.device.serial supported for new Mac App Store updates?
I’m preparing an update to a native macOS serial logger already distributed through the Mac App Store. The app uses IOSerialBSDClient to enumerate serial ports, opens the selected /dev/cu.* device with open(O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY | O_NONBLOCK), and configures it with termios. On macOS 27.2, open() returns EPERM with App Sandbox enabled and the USB and Bluetooth entitlements present. The same port opens successfully from a process without App Sandbox. I reproduced this with several adapters. Apple’s archived Entitlement Key Reference lists com.apple.security.device.serial and describes adding it manually: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Miscellaneous/Reference/EntitlementKeyReference/Chapters/EnablingAppSandbox.html The macOS 27.2 App Sandbox profile still contains a rule for this entitlement, but I couldn’t find it in the current entitlement documentation or in Xcode 27.2’s Signing & Capabilities editor. Is adding com.apple.security.device.serial manually to the app’s signed entitlements still the supported approach for new Mac App Store updates? Does it require separate approval or provisioning authorization? If this entitlement is no longer supported for Mac App Store submissions, what does Apple recommend for accessing system-provided BSD serial ports with App Sandbox enabled? The app needs to work with ports exposed by both system and third-party drivers and configure them through termios. Would a temporary file access exception for /dev/ be appropriate for this use case?
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SFAuthorizationPluginView returns nil at the active-session lock screen (screensaver unlock), non-MDM
What we're trying to do We ship a Developer-ID authorization plugin (a SecurityAgent AuthorizationPlugin bundle exporting AuthorizationPluginCreate, hosting an SFAuthorizationPluginView subclass) that presents custom credential + MFA UI at macOS authentication surfaces — the Jamf Connect / NoMAD / XCreds pattern. This works correctly at the login window (system.login.console). We now want the same custom UI at the active-session lock screen (screensaver unlock), so a managed user can satisfy an MFA step on unlock — without MDM. We understand Platform SSO is the MDM-based path; we're specifically asking about the non-MDM AuthorizationPlugin path, which Cisco Duo and RSA appear to ship on macOS 14/15. Environment macOS Sonoma 14.8.7 and Sequoia 15.7.7 / 15.7.9, Apple Silicon (arm64). Non-MDM. Standard Developer ID distribution, no configuration profiles. Plugin bundle: Developer ID Application + Hardened Runtime (flags=runtime), satisfies its DR, notarized. Bundle has an empty NSPrincipalClass and no NSMainNibFile; construction follows the NameAndPassword DTS sample exactly (alloc the SFAuthorizationPluginView subclass via -initWithCallbacks:andEngineRef: in MechanismInvoke, then -displayView). Reproduction Install the plugin into /Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins/. Define a custom right (class = evaluate-mechanisms, mechanisms = [ OurPlugin:invoke ]) — we do not replace the screensaver rule. Append that right to the existing rule, keeping use-login-window-ui: system.login.screensaver (class = rule): rule = [ use-login-window-ui, com.example.screensaver-mfa ] (This "append after use-login-window-ui" arming matches what Cisco Duo's installer does — native password unlock runs first, then the appended mechanism runs in the post-password phase.) Lock, then unlock. What we observe Our mechanism is invoked at unlock (MechanismInvoke runs — so the arming is correct; the modern path otherwise never invokes third-party plugins). But inside MechanismInvoke, on the main thread, in SecurityAgentHelper-arm64: host check: AgentPluginViewHelper = PRESENT // we're in the SecurityAgent GUI host probe: callbacks->version = 4, GetHintValue = <ptr> // engine callbacks, unmodified probe: authorize-right PRESENT rc=0 val=system.login.screensaver presenter alloc'd p = 0x0 (nil = 1) // init returns nil -[SFAuthorizationPluginView initWithCallbacks:andEngineRef:] returns nil. Every downstream symptom we'd chased earlier (black screen, spinner, "ViewBridge … Connection invalid") is just a consequence of there being no view object. What we've ruled out Tracing the construction path (-initWithCallbacks:andEngineRef: → -loadPlugin → [AgentPluginViewHelper loadPluginForRight:engineRef:pluginView:]), we've eliminated: Host process — AgentPluginViewHelper is present; we're in SecurityAgent, not authorizationhost (our UI mechanism is non-privileged). The authorize-right hint — present and correct (system.login.screensaver), read straight through callbacks->GetHintValue. Callbacks / engineRef — valid, version == 4, passed through unmodified (same pointer the engine handed us). The nib — no NSMainNibFile set. The right→product mapping — the right maps to the builtin product, whose plugin object constructs unconditionally. That leaves the display_view re-host step, which appears bound to whether this SecurityAgent instance currently has a live, connection-accepting view-hosting session. Our hypothesis: use-login-window-ui completes the native unlock and tears down its view-hosting session, so our appended mechanism runs after teardown → no live host for display_view → the builtin display mechanism's init fails → SFAuthorizationPluginView init returns nil. The experiment that should have fixed it — but didn't The vendor that ships this (Duo) brackets its non-privileged GUI mechanism with a leading privileged mechanism (and a trailing one). A privileged mechanism runs in authorizationhost; we hypothesized the privileged→non-privileged transition makes authd re-activate SecurityAgent and stand up a fresh view-hosting session before the GUI mechanism runs. We mirrored exactly that: [ OurPlugin:precheck,privileged, OurPlugin:invoke, OurPlugin:complete,privileged ] where precheck/complete are no-op privileged mechanisms that just SetResult(allow). The logs confirm the transition happened: precheck ran in authorizationhosthelper, then invoke ran in a freshly spawned SecurityAgentHelper process (so SecurityAgent did re-activate), with AgentPluginViewHelper present and the hint correct — yet SFAuthorizationPluginView init still returned nil. So replicating the vendor's authorizationdb structure is not sufficient. The remaining difference is either an OS precondition that simply isn't met during a locked-session unlock (the agent isn't accepting view-hosting connections in that context), or something in the vendor's bundle/build (entitlements, embedded XPC/frameworks) rather than the authdb wiring. Questions Is presenting a custom SFAuthorizationPluginView at the active-session lock screen a supported scenario for a non-MDM Developer-ID authorization plugin on macOS 14/15? If yes — what is the supported way to ensure a live view-hosting session exists for a mechanism appended to system.login.screensaver after use-login-window-ui? Is the leading-privileged-mechanism pattern intended, or is there a documented right/API we should use? If SFAuthorizationPluginView init returning nil in this context is expected, please confirm and point us to the sanctioned alternative for custom credential UI at screensaver unlock without MDM. Does any of this differ on Managed vs. non-Managed devices, or depend on SIP / FileVault / Secure Enclave state? References Forums 110667 — use-login-window-ui blocks third-party plugins; legacy path invokes them ("not a bug"). Forums 744211, 771114 — SFAuthorizationPluginView / ViewBridge / viewForType: never called at the lock screen on macOS 15. Feedback FB13238136, FB13128730 — third-party plugin at the lock shield; Data-Protection keychain from screensaver context. Sample code: NameAndPassword — our construction shape matches it exactly. I can provide a minimal reproducer bundle and a sysdiagnose + unified-log capture around a failed unlock on request.
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Empty initiatorOrigin in Redirect SSO extension authorization options on macOS 27
In our macOS Redirect SSO extension, initiatorOrigin is empty in the authorization options received in beginAuthorization(with:). The corresponding AppSSOAgent log shows: localhost AppSSOAgent[55733]: (AppSSOUI) [com.apple.AppSSO:SOAgent] -[SOAgent beginAuthorizationWithRequestParameters:completion:] { AuthorizationOptions = { initiatingAction = 0; initiatorOrigin = ""; path = ""; userActionInitiated = 1; };Is this expected behavior for certain SSO requests, or could this indicate an issue in macOS 27?
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Empty initiatorOrigin in Redirect SSO extension authorization options on macOS 27
We are developing a macOS Redirect SSO extension and observing an empty initiatorOrigin in the authorization options received in beginAuthorization(with:). The corresponding AppSSOAgent log shows: localhost AppSSOAgent[55733]: (AppSSOUI) [com.apple.AppSSO:SOAgent] -[SOAgent beginAuthorizationWithRequestParameters:completion:] { AuthorizationOptions = { initiatingAction = 0; initiatorOrigin = ""; path = ""; userActionInitiated = 1; };Is this expected behavior for certain SSO requests, or could this indicate an issue in macOS 27?
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Core Motion timing between Apple Watch and iPhone under required reason 35F9.1
We are developing an Apple Watch and iPhone training app and would like guidance on the required-reason API requirements for sharing a timing relationship between the two apps. On Apple Watch, we record Core Motion samples and read ProcessInfo.processInfo.systemUptime when each sample callback arrives. The paired iPhone uses timing information to analyze sample ordering and freshness. The two values relevant to this question are: Measurement timestamp: CMLogItem.timestamp associated with the Core Motion sample on Apple Watch. Callback observation time: systemUptime read by the Watch app when it receives that sample’s callback. The proposed interval is the callback observation time minus the measurement timestamp, calculated on the Watch. Both endpoints are on the Watch. The iPhone is the intended recipient of the interval; its receipt time is not an endpoint of this calculation. For illustration only, synthetic values of 1,000.000 seconds for the measurement timestamp and 1,000.020 seconds for the callback observation time would produce a proposed interval of 0.020 seconds. These are not real measurements. This arithmetic example does not establish clock compatibility or permission to transmit the result. Apple’s documentation describes CMLogItem.timestamp as seconds since device boot. The System Boot Time required-reason API list includes systemUptime and mach_absolute_time(). Reason 35F9.1 permits certain elapsed-time measurements and includes an exception for elapsed time between events that occurred within the app. Our questions are: Is CMLogItem.timestamp itself covered by the System Boot Time required-reason API category? We do not see this property explicitly included in the published list. Under reason 35F9.1, may the interval between a Core Motion measurement timestamp and the app’s callback observation time be sent from Apple Watch to its paired iPhone for analysis? Specifically, does it qualify for the exception for elapsed time between events that occurred within the app, given that the measurement time comes from Core Motion? If not, is there an approved way to represent this timing relationship while preserving sample ordering and freshness analysis? Which timing information may be transferred, and which approved reason, if any, applies? We are not reporting an Apple API malfunction. We are asking how to implement this use in accordance with the privacy requirements. Our focused local Xcode sample uses synthetic values only. It does not collect real motion data or transmit data between devices.
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Developed an app and run it, now I see autofill (app name) in activity monitor. Please help!
Developed an app and run it, now I see Autofill (app name) in activity monitor. Please help! I am using opensource libraries. My other developed apps does not show autofill (app name) and it uses the same libs. The differences with the 2 is that the one with the problem uses: assimp, and freetype 2. Is this a security risk? I am thinking maybe if i run this app in sudo mode it will autofill and reveal my password to hackers. What is the best way to mitigate this?
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ATT iOS 27.2 EU – Does the 12-month reprompt interval include decisions made before iOS 27.2?
Hello, We are investigating the new annual ATT reprompting behavior introduced in iOS 27.2 for EU users. Apple's documentation states that developers can request ATT authorization again one year after the user's previous choice. However, we would like to clarify how this applies to existing ATT decisions made before iOS 27.2. Questions Previous ATT decisions older than 12 months If a user denied ATT permission in March 2025 on an earlier iOS version and upgrades to iOS 27.2 in November 2026, can the app immediately display the ATT prompt again? Previous ATT decisions less than 12 months old If a user denied ATT permission in June 2026, will the next ATT prompt become available in June 2027, or does the 12-month period start from the installation of iOS 27.2? Historical ATT decision timestamps Does iOS maintain the original timestamp of ATT decisions made on previous iOS versions, or does the new annual reprompting mechanism only track decisions recorded from iOS 27.2 onwards? Reprompt eligibility API Is there any public API that allows developers to determine whether a user is eligible for an ATT reprompt, without actually attempting to display it? Context This is particularly important for existing applications and Consent Management Platforms (CMPs), where we need to coordinate ATT authorization with GDPR consent flows. Understanding whether the 12-month interval applies retroactively to existing ATT decisions would help us implement the new behavior correctly without unnecessarily prompting users or disrupting existing consent flows. Thank you for your clarification
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Authentication code for mobile phone not received
I am trying to fix an expired TestFlight build, which requires an update. However, when I attempt to log in to my developer account, I get stuck at the mobile phone authentication step. Although I have entered the correct phone number, the verification code never arrives on my device—even after multiple attempts—and the phone-based authentication option itself is not working. What should I do?
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Unexpected Core Foundation attribute types when inspecting an existing Secure Enclave-associated Keychain key on macOS
Hello Apple Developer community, I'm investigating an unexpected metadata representation returned by Apple's Security framework while inspecting an existing Secure Enclave-associated Keychain item on macOS. A read-only inspection using SecItemCopyMatching returns one matching key record with a successful status, a Secure Enclave token identifier (com.apple.setoken), and a 256-bit key size. However, direct Core Foundation type inspection reports: kSecAttrKeyType: CFNumber kSecAttrKeyClass: CFNumber kSecAttrSynchronizable: CFNumber The raw Core Foundation observations and bridged observations agree. Our current validator rejects these unexpected types and returns UNSUPPORTED_OR_INCOMPLETE_METADATA. We have deliberately stopped further key operations pending clarification. Questions: Can these CFNumber values legitimately appear in a dictionary returned by SecItemCopyMatching for Secure Enclave-associated key items on macOS? What returned value types should be expected for these three attributes, and are they dependent on the query or Keychain implementation? Is there an Apple-recommended way to normalize or validate these attributes without incorrectly accepting incompatible metadata? How should an application distinguish an existing Secure Enclave-backed key from an incomplete or unsupported Keychain record without performing a private-key operation? Are there relevant Security framework documentation references or known implementation differences we should consult? Our aim is to validate the existing record safely without regenerating, deleting, or using the private key. Thank you for your guidance.
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Can macOS restrict a signing key to one exact build of a system daemon?
Hi Apple Developer Technical Support, We have a locally signed macOS system daemon that an administrator starts manually. It needs to use a dedicated P-256 signing key in a file-based keychain. We want macOS to let only the exact approved build use that key, without a prompt. A different build signed with the same certificate should be denied. Apple’s published Security source shows that the keychain can identify some callers by their code directory hash (cdhash). Is setting a key’s partition list to that exact hash a supported way to enforce this restriction for a system daemon? If so, which macOS versions support it, and what API or Apple tool should we use to configure it? After setup, how can we verify that the intended key has the exact restriction in place, including whether any broader rule allows another process to sign with the key, export it, or change its access rules? If macOS doesn’t offer a supported way to set and verify this restriction, please confirm that limitation.
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Apple Music off-device authorization for Android TV / WebOS — supported integration and client registration
Hello, I am developing an application that integrates with Apple Music to provide a personalized music video experience for Apple Music subscribers. We are working on support for many devices like Android TV / Google TV / WebOS / etc. and would like to implement an authorization experience suitable for a television, where entering account credentials with a remote control is cumbersome. Intended authorization flow We would like to implement the following experience: The application on the TV displays a QR code or short activation code. The user scans the QR code with their phone and opens an Apple-hosted authentication and authorization page. The user signs in to their Apple Account if necessary and approves Apple Music access for the application on the TV. The TV application receives or retrieves the resulting authorization and can use it for the supported Apple Music functionality. The objective is for the TV application itself to be authorized following approval on the phone, with no need to enter the Apple Account credentials on the television. Relevant implementation evidence found on Apple’s website While researching this integration, we examined JavaScript publicly served by link.apple.com. In the following OAuth view bundle, we observed these identifiers: PartnerAuthorizationRequest isOffDeviceOAuth2Flow DEVICE_CODE Source: Apple-hosted OAuth view bundle — oauth-views-OAuth-vue.4db9105e.js In the associated OAuth initializer bundle, we observed properties including: client_id scope response_type Source: Apple-hosted OAuth initializer bundle — oauth-views-OAuthInitializer-vue.23605d03.js These elements suggest that Apple’s authorization interface includes an off-device authorization path associated with partner clients. We understand that these implementation details are not public API documentation and do not establish whether this flow is available to third-party developers. We are looking for the officially supported integration and enrollment process, if one is available. Clarification requested 1. Availability for third-party TV applications Does Apple offer a supported Apple Music authorization flow of this kind for third-party applications running on non-Apple devices? If the observed flow is limited to certain integrations or partners, what are the eligibility requirements for obtaining access? 2. Client registration and account configuration What is the official process for registering or obtaining a client_id authorized to use this flow? We have reviewed the standard MusicKit configuration involving Media IDs, Media Services keys, App Services and Capability Requests, but have not identified the configuration or application process for off-device authorization. Could you clarify whether this requires: A standard MusicKit Media ID and Media Services key; An additional service configuration or managed capability request in the Apple Developer account; A separate OAuth client registration; Or approval through an Apple Music partner program? 3. Supported integration documentation If this integration is available, where can we obtain the documentation or SDK covering: The required client configuration, request parameters and permitted scopes; Creation of the authorization request and the QR code or activation link; The mechanism by which the TV checks for completion or receives the result; The resulting token type, its intended use, and its expiration or reauthorization requirements? In particular, we would appreciate clarification on whether the resulting authorization provides a Music User Token usable by the TV application, or another token that requires a documented exchange. 4. Apple Music access on the authorized TV Which Apple Music APIs or SDKs can consume the resulting authorization? We would like to confirm its supported use with Apple Music API and MusicKit for Android, including any separate requirements for playback on the TV. Our intended design is for authorization to be issued for the TV application, rather than transferring a Music User Token issued for the phone. If this access is handled outside the standard MusicKit developer workflow, could you please identify the applicable program and enrollment process, or who to route this request to the Apple Music team responsible for partner authorization and connected-device integrations? Thank you for helping us identify the supported path for this integration. Louis
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Account Membership Expired / Team ID DNQ8PB6F6V Unreachable Due to Deprecated Profile Conflict
Apple Developer Account — Access & Subscription Issue Hello Apple Developer Support, I am writing to resolve a critical access and subscription issue with my Apple Developer account. My Apple ID (lich666black@gmail.com, Person ID: 1669634243, Developer ID: L2B6257ZS2) is the Account Holder for my organization, Khasanshin Rinat Ildarovich, IP (Team ID: DNQ8PB6F6V, App Store Connect Legal Entity ID: 90331734). Current Blocking State In App Store Connect, the organization team DNQ8PB6F6V shows that the membership has expired and prompts me to accept the updated Apple Developer Program License Agreement on the Apple Developer website. However, when I log into developer.apple.com/account, the portal backend returns an empty teams array (teams: []) with isAgentOfAnyActiveTeam: false, and defaults my web session to an old duplicate profile ("Rinat khasanshin", marked as Deprecated in ASC). Because of this, the web portal hides my organization team and only displays the "Enroll today" button. When I try to use it, the system blocks me with the error: "Your Apple Account is already associated with the Account Holder of a membership." Additionally, I cannot use the native macOS Apple Developer app to resolve this, because the app requires a newer version of macOS than what is currently running on my Mac. Request Could you please assist in: Unlinking or merging the deprecated profile; Re-syncing my active organization team (DNQ8PB6F6V); Updating the membership status so I can properly access the portal and sign the updated agreement? Thank you for your help.
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Repeated login Keychain prompts and securityd crash after app upgrade on macOS 26.6.x
Overview We are investigating repeated "login" Keychain prompts affecting our macOS application on macOS 26.6.x. The issue appears after upgrading an existing installation. A clean uninstall/reinstall of the same version resolves it. Changing the affected Keychain item's Access Control from "Confirm before allowing access" to explicitly allowing our application/process also stops the prompts. On one affected machine, Apple Support observed a securityd crash followed by: SecKeyCreateSignature failed CSSMERR_DL_INVALID_DB_HANDLE Our code uses some legacy SecKeychain* APIs, so we are currently investigating whether this is related. Questions Were there any changes in macOS 26.6.x around securityd, Keychain ACL handling, or legacy SecKeychain* APIs that could explain this? Could an existing Keychain ACL become stale after an application upgrade, even when both versions are signed with the same Developer ID?
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Secure Enclave: Supporting Signing-Only, Key-Agreement-Only, and Dual-Purpose Keys
Hello everyone, I'm trying to understand the actual limitations of the Secure Enclave (SEP) regarding cryptographic key capabilities, and more specifically how to generate and store the following key types in the keychain: Sign only: The key can only be used for digital signatures. Key agreement only: The key can only be used for key agreement operations. All operations: The key can be used for both signing and key agreement. I've noticed some apparent differences between Apple's Security framework and CryptoKit, and I'm trying to understand whether these differences reflect actual SEP limitations or simply framework-level restrictions. 1. Security framework: dual purpose keys I'm currently using SecKeyCreateRandomKey to generate Secure Enclave-backed keys. Here is the relevant code: NSDictionary *privateAttributes = @{ (__bridge id)kSecAttrIsPermanent : @YES, (__bridge id)kSecAttrAccessControl : ..., (__bridge id)kSecAttrApplicationTag : ..., // key agreement only (__bridge id)kSecAttrCanSign: @NO, (__bridge id)kSecAttrCanDerive: @YES }; NSMutableDictionary *attributes = [ @{ (__bridge id)kSecAttrKeyType : (__bridge id)kSecAttrKeyTypeECSECPrimeRandom, (__bridge id)kSecAttrTokenID : (__bridge id)kSecAttrTokenIDSecureEnclave, (__bridge id)kSecAttrKeySizeInBits : @256, (__bridge id)kSecPrivateKeyAttrs : privateAttributes } mutableCopy ]; CFErrorRef generationError = nullptr; SecKeyRef privateKey = SecKeyCreateRandomKey( (__bridge CFDictionaryRef)attributes, &generationError );However, when experimenting with these attributes, I encountered the following error: SecKeyCreateRandomKey failed: Error Domain=NSOSStatusErrorDomain Code=-50 "Failed to generate keypair" Underlying error: Error Domain=CryptoTokenKit Code=-8 "sepkey: sign requires '1' value when present"Using signing-only attributes results in the same kind of error. This makes me wonder whether the Security framework actually allows generating (and adding entries in the keyChain) only keys with both capabilities enabled. It is possible to create siging only key or key agreement only key with Security framework? 2. CryptoKit: Separate key types On the other hand, CryptoKit seems to expose two distinct Secure Enclave key types: P256.SecureEnclave.Signing.PrivateKey P256.SecureEnclave.KeyAgreement.PrivateKeyFrom the API design, it appears that CryptoKit only allows creating keys dedicated to one operation or the other. For example, a Signing.PrivateKey cannot be used for key agreement, and a KeyAgreement.PrivateKey cannot be used for signing. Is it possible to create both capabilities keys with CryptoKit framework? 3. Actual Secure Enclave limitations What are the actual cryptographic capability limitations imposed by the SEP itself? I'd particularly like to understand which restrictions originate from: The Secure Enclave hardware. Security and CryptoKit frameworks. Is there a documented way to generate and store in the keychain: A signing-only Secure Enclave key? A key-agreement-only Secure Enclave key? A Secure Enclave key supporting both operations? Thanks in advance, Idopte
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Platform SSO OpenID and Keychain after a password reset
Hi, I'm trying to understand how the new OpenID authentication in macOS 27 behaves after a user resets their password in the identity provider. I understand that Microsoft Entra ID does not currently support the new OpenID Platform SSO flow in macOS 27. I'm using Entra ID only as an example here, my question is about the general macOS behavior and should apply equally to other identity providers such as Okta, Google Workspace, or any other IdP that implements the required Platform SSO 2.0 / OpenID support. Example: Mac is configured with Platform SSO and AuthenticationMethod = OpenID FileVault is enabled the user already has an existing local account and login Keychain the user resets their IdP password remotely they no longer remember the old local Mac password at the next Mac login they authenticate successfully using the new OpenID web login What happens next? If AllowWebLoginPasswordSync is enabled, I understand that macOS can synchronize the new IdP password to the local Mac account. My main question is what happens to the existing Keychain. Does macOS preserve the existing login.keychain and its contents, or can the user lose access to it because the old local password is no longer known? I'm also interested in what happens to things that depend on the existing Keychain, for example: saved application credentials certificates and private keys Wi-Fi credentials Apple Account / iCloud sign-in state And how does Platform SSO 2.0 Key Service fit into this? Apple documentation says that Key Service can unlock the user's key bag before login. Does that also help preserve access to the existing login Keychain when the old local password is no longer available? In practical terms, I'm trying to understand whether macOS 27 finally supports this workflow without losing user data or credentials: User forgets the Mac password → resets their IdP password → signs in through OpenID → continues using the same Mac profile and Keychain normally. Thanks :)
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Adopting Trust Insights in a global app: what works, what I measured, and what I could not find
I have been working through what it would take for a real app, say a bank's, to adopt Trust Insights in a way that works for customers around the world, using only what has been published so far: session 379, the framework documentation and the support article. While the client side works well, there is information a production app needs that I could not find. So I am posting this for two reasons. Some of what I learned may save you time, and since the rest needs an answer from Apple, I would like to have those questions answered in one place. If you would like to see working code, the sample project I used keeps all of the API in one file. What I measured Adding the Trust Insights capability in Xcode was all I needed to get the whole flow running on a device: the permission alert, the evaluation and the report. The simulator returns .unavailable, so you will need a device to test any of this. There are two switches to keep in mind, the system one at Settings > Privacy & Security > Impersonation Risk Detection, and one for each app underneath it. This is what I got from authorizationStatus(for:) in a development build: With the setting turned off, for the app or for everything, it returned .denied right away, even though the support article says changes might take up to 24 hours. It was still .denied 24 hours later. When I turned the setting back on, it returned .authorized right away. After deleting and reinstalling the app it returned .denied, and did not go back to .notDetermined. So while the documentation describes .denied as the person refusing permission, in practice it also covers the setting being off, and you should plan for customers who will never see your permission alert. Since I could not find an API that opens that page in Settings, all you can do is tell them where it is, and you should call it Impersonation Risk Detection because that is the name they will see there. What I would do today Treat having no evaluation as a normal path. Between permissions, availability, the network and server errors, some of your customers will not get a result, and in all of those cases your existing checks should decide and the transaction should carry on as it did before. Start the evaluation early. The session says it takes a couple of seconds and the documentation says several, so I start it when the screen appears, and a production app should also stop waiting after a deadline of its own. An evaluation that comes back too late still has to be reported, as .notUsedError. Call reportConsumption once for every evaluation, on every path, including a transaction the person cancels (.notUsedNotNeeded). The documentation says that skipping it may result in rate limiting or losing access to the service, so this is not something to leave for later. Until the server side details are available, only use the result to add friction. A decision made in the app can be changed by anyone who can change the app, which does not matter for a warning, but it does matter if unknown lets someone skip a check. Keep the eventID with your transaction records, even if you have no way of using it yet, because that is what the documentation says identifies the evaluation when fraud is discovered later. If your fraud team wants to see numbers before anything changes for customers, .usedEvaluationOnly is the documented way to report an evaluation that had no effect on a decision. For UI work, put your decision behind a type of your own and drive the warning screens from a debug switch, because there is no way to create the conditions for a medium or a high on purpose. What I could not find: the information we need from Apple These are the questions I would like answered, along with what each one means for you until they are. The session says values and errors can be overridden with launch arguments, and refers to the documentation for the list. Where can we find that list? Until then, the medium, high and error paths can only be tested by reading the code, which is not a comfortable place to be for a flow that holds someone's money. Which devices and regions are supported, and what determines the region that applies to a device? The documentation for .unavailable mentions both without listing them, so if your app has customers around the world, you cannot yet tell your support team who should be getting this, and .unavailable on its own will not tell you why. What status should an app expect on a phone where the setting has never been changed, and can it show the permission alert in that state? If the answer is .denied, your app cannot ask until the customer has found the setting on their own, which would change how you plan for adoption. What does the 24 hour delay apply to, and do evaluations behave differently during it? Because the status changes immediately, at least in development, I cannot tell you what to expect in production. Which environment do TestFlight, Ad Hoc and Enterprise builds use? The session only separates development (sandbox) from the App Store (production), so you cannot be sure how much your beta testing tells you about production. What are the rate limits, and is there guidance for rolling this out to a large installed base, as there is for App Attest? The documentation says a limit can apply to the app on one device or across all devices. For now I would ramp up slowly, and treat rateLimitExceeded as having no evaluation. What period of activity does an evaluation reflect, and how long does the result stay meaningful? Because I have to start it early, I do not know how much a result from when the screen appeared says about what is happening when the person taps Confirm a few minutes later. How does a server verify signedPayload? I could not find the keys or the payload schema. Until that is available, using a result to reduce friction (.usedReducedFriction) cannot be done safely. Where is the API for reporting fraud after the fact documented, and can it be used without a verified business on Apple Business Register? The session refers to the documentation for this, and also to Partner Data Services, which I could not find described anywhere public. I have filed all of this as a documentation request, FB25453150, which also covers a few smaller items like language support and privacy declarations. I will update this thread as I learn more, and if you have measured something different from what I describe here, please post it, because that would help everyone working on this. S.BECK - 7strikes.dev
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Using Cryptokit.SecureEnclave API from a Launch Daemon
We are interested in using a hardware-bound key in a launch daemon. In a previous post, Quinn explicitly told me this is not possible to use an SE keypair outside of the system context and my reading of the Apple documentation also supports that. That said, we have gotten the following key-creation and persistence flow to work, so we have some questions as to how this fits in with the above. (1) In a launch daemon (running thus as root), we do: let key = SecureEnclave.P256.Signing.PrivateKey() (2) We then use key.dataRepresentation to store a reference to the key in the system keychain as a kSecClassGenericPassword. (3) When we want to use the key, we fetch the data representation from system keychain and we "rehydrate" the key using: SecureEnclave.P256.Signing.PrivateKey(dataRepresentation: data) (4) We then use the output of the above to sign whatever we want. My questions: in the above flow, are we actually getting a hardware-bound key from the Secure Enclave or is this working because it's actually defaulting to a non-hardware-backed key? if it is an SE key, is it that the Apple documentation stating that you can only use the SE with the Data Protection Keychain in the user context is outdated (or wrong)? does the above work, but is not an approach sanctioned by Apple? Any feedback on this would be greatly appreciated.
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Sign in with Apple shows old app name (“Pet Companion”) after renaming to PawAide — all identifiers updated
Our app’s Sign in with Apple sheet still says “Create an account for Pet Companion,” but the app was renamed to PawAide, and every setting we control has been updated: Primary App ID (app.replit.petcompanion): description is “PawAide,” set as the Primary App ID for Sign in with Apple, no other grouped App IDs Services ID (web flow): description is “PawAide,” linked to the primary App ID above App Store Connect: app name is “PawAide” (English U.S., our only localization), and the app is live on the App Store under that name These changes were made over 11 days ago. I have revoked the app under Settings → Sign in with Apple and retested on new TestFlight builds. The old name still appears in both the native iOS sheet and the web flow. Sign-in itself works fine; only the display name is wrong. Developer Support suggested checking these same identifiers, which are all already correct. Has anyone seen the Sign in with Apple display name stay stuck like this? Is there a way to get the cached name refreshed on Apple’s side? Support case: 103007748183 Thanks for any help!
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