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General: Forums topic: Privacy & Security Apple Platform Security support document Developer > Security Enabling enhanced security for your app documentation article Creating enhanced security helper extensions documentation article Security Audit Thoughts forums post Cryptography: Forums tags: Security, Apple CryptoKit Security framework documentation Apple CryptoKit framework documentation Common Crypto man pages — For the full list of pages, run: % man -k 3cc For more information about man pages, see Reading UNIX Manual Pages. On Cryptographic Key Formats forums post SecItem attributes for keys forums post CryptoCompatibility sample code Keychain: Forums tags: Security Security > Keychain Items documentation TN3137 On Mac keychain APIs and implementations SecItem Fundamentals forums post SecItem Pitfalls and Best Practices forums post Investigating hard-to-reproduce keychain problems forums post App ID Prefix Change and Keychain Access forums post Smart cards and other secure tokens: Forums tag: CryptoTokenKit CryptoTokenKit framework documentation Mac-specific resources: Forums tags: Security Foundation, Security Interface Security Foundation framework documentation Security Interface framework documentation BSD Privilege Escalation on macOS Related: Networking Resources — This covers high-level network security, including HTTPS and TLS. Network Extension Resources — This covers low-level network security, including VPN and content filters. Code Signing Resources Notarisation Resources Trusted Execution Resources — This includes Gatekeeper. App Sandbox Resources Share and Enjoy — Quinn “The Eskimo!” @ Developer Technical Support @ Apple let myEmail = "eskimo" + "1" + "@" + "apple.com"
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Privacy & Security Resources
General: Forums topic: Privacy & Security Privacy Resources Security Resources Share and Enjoy — Quinn “The Eskimo!” @ Developer Technical Support @ Apple let myEmail = "eskimo" + "1" + "@" + "apple.com"
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Two-way sync with Apple Calendar from an Expo/React Native app: iCloud CalDAV on the server, or EventKit on the device?
I'm building a family calendar app (Expo SDK 56 + Supabase). I already have two-way Google Calendar sync running server-side: OAuth, a calendar the app creates in the user's account, push notifications plus an incremental sync token, and an outbox for writes going out. Now I need two-way sync with Apple Calendar. A read-only .ics subscription doesn't work for me, because users need to edit on either side. I see two options: A: iCloud CalDAV from my server The user creates an app-specific password at appleid.apple.com and pastes it into the app. The server creates its own calendar (MKCALENDAR) and syncs with sync-collection, using the same outbox/worker I already have for Google. ✅ Works on every platform, including web, and keeps syncing when the app is closed. ❌ The setup is clunky for non-technical parents. ❌ An app-specific password unlocks the whole iCloud account (mail, contacts, every calendar), so I'd be storing a much broader credential than I need. ❌ iCloud doesn't push changes, so I'd have to poll. ❓ Apple doesn't officially support this. B: EventKit on the device (expo-calendar) The phone reads and writes its local calendars (iCloud, Exchange, and on Android whatever is in CalendarContract). ✅ No credentials, the OS permission prompt handles access, and it covers every account on the phone. ❌ Syncs only while the app runs (background fetch on iOS is unreliable). ❌ One user with two devices means two writers. ❌ Needs a native build, and does nothing on web. Questions for anyone who has shipped one of these: Is anyone running iCloud CalDAV with app-specific passwords in production? How do users take the setup, and has Apple ever pushed back or broken it? If you went with EventKit, how did you handle background sync and conflicts across several devices? Is there a third option I'm missing, or a hybrid (for example EventKit on iOS, server sync everywhere else)?
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Authentication-UI refusal for a file-based certificate query on macOS
The guidance in https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/739774 explains the context search list, the kSecMatchSearchList override and continued use of deprecated file-based APIs where that keychain model is required. For a SecItemCopyMatching query using kSecClassCertificate and an explicitly supplied file-based test keychain, what is the supported way to refuse authentication UI rather than allow a prompt? I am considering macOS 26.6.1 with the macOS 27.0 SDK; please clarify applicability to that combination and any relevant application-context restrictions. In particular, which refusal mechanism applies to the file-based path given the deprecation of earlier authentication-UI options? If access would require keychain unlock or authentication UI, is an error guaranteed, or can the query omit items and return success? A public documentation reference and any version limitations would be helpful. This is a contract question for a prospective test; I have not run it or reproduced a problem.
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Supported way to distinguish no extended ACL from ACL retrieval failure for an open file descriptor on macOS
Hello Apple Developer Forums, I am looking for a documented, supported user-space method on macOS to verify that an already-open file or directory has no extended ACL, while distinguishing that state from an unsupported filesystem or an ACL retrieval failure. Environment and observations: macOS 15.7.7 on an Intel Mac; Command Line Tools SDK 15.5. In an isolated synthetic test, acl_get_fd_np(fd, ACL_TYPE_EXTENDED) returned NULL with errno == ENOENT for a newly created regular file and directory with no ACL added by the test. The same API returned an ACL containing one ACE after an ACL was added to a separate synthetic file. An invalid file descriptor returned NULL with errno == EBADF. These are observations on this OS and test filesystem only. I have not interpreted ENOENT as proof of ACL absence, and I have not tested fgetattrlist. I could not establish from the available documentation whether NULL/ENOENT is a guaranteed indication of ACL absence. I also could not establish whether ATTR_CMN_RETURNED_ATTRS and KAUTH_FILESEC_NOACL provide a supported, stable user-space contract when using fgetattrlist. Questions: When acl_get_fd_np(fd, ACL_TYPE_EXTENDED) returns NULL with errno == ENOENT for an existing object, does that reliably mean the object has no extended ACL? Could it instead indicate unsupported or unavailable ACL data? When requesting ATTR_CMN_EXTENDED_SECURITY through fgetattrlist, how can a caller confirm that the attribute was actually returned? Is ATTR_CMN_RETURNED_ATTRS supported for fgetattrlist? How should omitted or unsupported attributes be distinguished from ACL absence? Is KAUTH_FILESEC_NOACL a supported, stable public user-space contract for parsing kauth_filesec returned by fgetattrlist? Under which documented conditions, if any, does it establish ACL absence? Does VOL_CAP_INT_EXTENDED_SECURITY establish only volume capability, or can it help establish per-object ACL absence? What documented result distinguishes an ACL-free object from a filesystem that does not support extended security? What guarantees apply when retrieving ACL information through an already-open descriptor if the pathname is renamed or replaced? Are ACL retrieval and fstat an atomic snapshot, particularly if another process changes the ACL? What supported API and decision procedure would Apple recommend for positively confirming no extended ACL on an already-open file or directory, while treating unsupported, omitted, malformed, and error results as distinct fail-closed outcomes? If this behavior is not covered by a supported public API contract, a clarification of that limitation and a reference to the closest documented API would be very helpful. Thank you.
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Reading Mouse Events with CGEvent tap from a background app in macOS 27.3
WIth macOS 27.3 (beta 2) things have changed quite a bit for security, see Updates to Device Control and Data Access, and Full Disk Access in macOS I have an app which uses what (used to be called) the Privacy & Security / Accessibility permissions in order to receive mouse events in the background to read them and occasionally modify them. The method used: The app checks AXIsProcessTrustedWithOptions to see if it has permission. If it doesn't have permission, it uses the kAXTrustedCheckOptionPrompt option which would open up the privacy & Security / Accessibility pane. Because that process has been a little flakey in macOS, my app has a backup option, where it runs 'open "x-apple.systempreferences:com.apple.settings.PrivacySecurity.extension?Privacy_Accessibility"' and then walks the user through the steps with onscreen instructions. When permission is granted, the app creates a CGEvent tap SessionEvent tap using the HeadInsertEvent option to receive mouse and touch mouse events. See CGEvent.tapCreate In macOS 27.3 beta 2, always returns false using kAXTrustedCheckOptionPrompt fails to do anything open "x-apple.systempreferences:com.apple.settings.PrivacySecurity.extension?Privacy_Accessibility fails to do anything. CGEvent tap fails A few questions: will my third party app be allowed to use CGEventTaps to read mouse and touchpad events? Or has this been cut off completely and only available to first party apps? If it is allowed, how? Has the permission for this moved to a different System Preference pane? is a CGEvent tap the way to do it? I totally understand that security is important, and apps should not have wide-ranging permissions. I'd love to find a way to keep my app running with the minimal permissions needed.
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ATT prompt not shown and status stays notDetermined: how do you handle it?
Hello, our Unity game (iOS/iPadOS) requests App Tracking Transparency on its first scene, before ads are initialized. Background App Review rejected an earlier build under Guideline 2.1(a) for a blank screen on iPad Air 11-inch (M3), iPadOS 27.0. In that build we called requestTrackingAuthorization right at launch and then waited until trackingAuthorizationStatus was no longer .notDetermined. The status never changed, so the app never left the first screen. Current flow (this build was approved) Wait until UIApplication.shared.applicationState == .active and the app has focus. Call requestTrackingAuthorization(completionHandler:) once and wait for the completion handler. If the completion returns .notDetermined, wait about 4 seconds while the app stays active, then call it one more time. Wait until the status is no longer .notDetermined before loading the next scene. There is no timeout. The first scene runs on every cold launch, so if the status is still .notDetermined, the request is made again on the next launch. [ATTrackingManager requestTrackingAuthorizationWithCompletionHandler:^(ATTrackingManagerAuthorizationStatus status) { dispatch_async(dispatch_get_main_queue(), ^{ // store status; Unity polls it on the main thread }); }];We have not been able to reproduce the original problem on our own devices. Questions for those who have shipped apps with ATT How many times do you retry requestTrackingAuthorization, and how long do you wait between attempts? Is there any limit you know of? If the status still stays .notDetermined after retrying, do you let the user continue and treat it as not authorized (no IDFA), or keep waiting? If you wait, how long before you let the user continue? If you continue without tracking, did App Review ever flag that? Any experience or pointers to documentation would be appreciated.
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macOS 27: Accessibility granted via MDM doesn’t cover PostEvent, and leaves a stray TCC managed_overrides row after unenrollment
Our app uses an active CGEventTap (kCGEventTapOptionDefault, mouse down/up events) and relies on the Accessibility permission (Device Control & Data Access). CGEventTapCreate(kCGAnnotatedSessionEventTap, kCGHeadInsertEventTap, kCGEventTapOptionDefault, CGEventMaskBit(kCGEventLeftMouseDown) | CGEventMaskBit(kCGEventLeftMouseUp) | CGEventMaskBit(kCGEventRightMouseDown) | CGEventMaskBit(kCGEventRightMouseUp) | CGEventMaskBit(kCGEventOtherMouseDown) | CGEventMaskBit(kCGEventOtherMouseUp), callback, refcon);On macOS 27.0.1 we see two behaviours when that permission comes from MDM, and we’d like to know whether they’re expected. According to the PrivacyPreferencesPolicyControl.Services documentation, the PPPC Accessibility key is deprecated in macOS 27. It’s replaced by the Privacy → PermissionDefaults setting in the declarative configuration com.apple.configuration.app.settings, and the managed value is a default that the user can change. We tested both the PPPC payload and the DDM configuration. 1. Managed Accessibility grant doesn’t cover PostEvent When the user turns on Accessibility manually in System Settings > Privacy & Security > Accessibility, the event tap works with no further prompts. When Accessibility comes from device management (a PPPC payload or DDM PermissionDefaults): AXIsProcessTrusted() returns true. On the first click through the tap, macOS shows the “control this computer” prompt. tccd adds an access row for kTCCServicePostEvent with auth_value 0 and auth_reason 4. At the same moment, the app’s Accessibility toggle in System Settings switches off. The managed Accessibility row remains auth_value 2, auth_reason 6. After the user accepts the prompt, PostEvent changes to auth_value 2 and the tap works from then on. Questions : Why does a manual Accessibility grant cover an active event tap, while a managed Accessibility default needs a separate PostEvent grant? With PPPC Accessibility deprecated, is DDM Accessibility plus PPPC PostEvent (Allowed) the intended configuration for apps that install active event taps? 2. Stray managed_overrides row after unenrollment On macOS 27, the managed Accessibility value is stored in a new managed_overrides table in /Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db (schema version 36). On macOS 15 and 26, managed grants were kept in MDMOverrides.plist, and this table doesn’t exist there. Steps : Enroll a never-managed Mac in MDM with user-approved enrollment. Install a profile that grants Accessibility to our app. tccd logs ManagedSettings: inserted managed_overrides for kTCCServiceAccessibility:<bundle id> admin_auth_value=2 auth_value=2. The row is written with policy_id NULL, and policies and active_policy stay empty. Remove the MDM profile from System Settings > General > Device Management. What happens: mdmclient removes the MDM profile first. Removing each TCC payload after that fails with : PlugIn: DetermineUninstallFlags [TCCProfileService] Error: Error Domain=NSPOSIXErrorDomain Code=13 "Permission denied" UserInfo={NSLocalizedDescription=The profile must originate from a user-approved MDM server.}The profiles disappear, MDMOverrides.plist is deleted, and profiles status reports no MDM enrollment. The row remains, with auth_value 1, auth_reason 6 (MDM Policy), policy_id NULL, admin_auth_value 2 and flags 480. tccutil reset Accessibility <bundle id> clears flags but doesn’t remove the row. Later permission prompts and System Settings toggles for the app write to this row instead of to access. Why does the row stay after unenrollment? Is there a supported way to clear it?
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No lifecycle notification when entering App Switcher while app remains inactive after Face ID
We use LAContext.evaluatePolicy(.deviceOwnerAuthentication) for a local app lock. On an iPhone 16 Pro running iOS 26.6.2, after authentication succeeds, UIApplication.shared.applicationState can remain .inactive for approximately 2–8 seconds although the app UI is visible. If the user enters the App Switcher during this interval, the app receives no additional willResignActive or didEnterBackground notification. Returning to the app produces only didBecomeActive. This means the app cannot distinguish between: remaining in the app while the Face ID UI finishes dismissing; and entering the App Switcher and returning during the same inactive interval. Reproduction: Run a minimal UIKit app on a physical Face ID device. Call evaluatePolicy(.deviceOwnerAuthentication). Immediately after successful authentication, enter the App Switcher before didBecomeActive. Wait three seconds and return. Is there a supported public API or lifecycle pattern that lets an app lock immediately in this situation without keeping its content covered until didBecomeActive?
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Credential Provider Extension should allow BE=0, BS=0 for device-bound passkeys
In these threads, it was clarified that Credential Provider Extensions must set both Backup Eligible (BE) and Backup State (BS) flags to 1 in authenticator data: https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/745605 https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/787629 However, I'm developing a passkey manager that intentionally stores credentials only on the local device. My implementation uses: kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly for keychain items kSecAttrTokenIDSecureEnclave for private keys No iCloud sync or backup These credentials are, by definition, single-device credentials. According to the WebAuthn specification, they should be represented with BE=0, BS=0. Currently, I'm forced to set BE=1, BS=1 to make the extension work, which misrepresents the actual backup status to relying parties. This is problematic because: Servers using BE/BS flags for security policies will incorrectly classify these as synced passkeys Users who specifically want device-bound credentials for higher security cannot get accurate flag representation Request: Please allow Credential Provider Extensions to return credentials with BE=0, BS=0 for legitimate device-bound passkey implementations. Environment: macOS 26.2 (25C56), Xcode 26.2 (17C52)
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AuthorizationRightSet called from an endpoint security extension fails with -60008
The Mac has managed profiles installed giving the endpoint security process full disk access. Most Macs do not get this error and AuthorizationRightSet works properly. However, one Mac gets the -60008 error and I can't determine the cause. Should an endpoint security extension be able to call AuthorizationRightSet?
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How can a macOS app safely extend and independently verify an existing Keychain item’s ACL and partition list?
I’m investigating a macOS Keychain access-control question involving an existing generic-password item and a separately code-signed application. The requirement is to authorize the application to access the existing item while preserving all previously authorized applications, partition-list entries, and other security restrictions. The item must remain in its existing Keychain. Recreating, replacing, or migrating it is not acceptable. My understanding is that legacy trusted-application ACLs and Keychain partition lists can impose separate restrictions, and that modifying one does not necessarily preserve or satisfy the other. I would appreciate clarification on four questions: Is there a supported macOS API for adding one trusted application to an existing generic-password item’s ACL while preserving all other ACL entries and restrictions? Is there a supported API for modifying an existing item’s partition list without replacing or inadvertently broadening its existing authorization policy? After making these changes, is there a supported method to independently enumerate and verify the complete resulting ACL and partition-list policy, rather than relying solely on a successful access attempt? If complete independent verification is not supported, what approach does Apple recommend for safely extending access to an existing Keychain item without weakening its current protections? The goal is a narrowly scoped, auditable authorization change, not a general relaxation of Keychain security. I’m particularly interested in the distinction between what macOS technically permits and what Apple officially supports for production applications. Thank you for any guidance or relevant documentation.
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Verifying a stored file-based Keychain trusted-application requirement
I'm evaluating a macOS file-based Keychain ACL that should authorize one application identity, defined by an intended code-signing requirement. The application is a shared Python interpreter; I understand that trusting it does not restrict access to an individual script. I read the related Apple Developer Forums discussion, which explains that complete ACL introspection is not supported and that the stored trusted-application code-signing requirement is accessible through SPI rather than public API. My narrower question is whether there is a supported verification operation that does not require exposing that requirement: Given a SecTrustedApplicationRef obtained through SecACLCopyContents, can a public API establish that its stored caller-matching requirement is no broader than the intended application requirement? Confirming that the intended application is accepted would establish only that it matches, not that additional application identities are excluded. I also don't want to assume that CFEqual against a newly created reference, matching paths, or matching SecTrustedApplicationCopyData results proves equivalent authorization. Apple's documentation describes the CopyData result as opaque. If this comparison is unsupported, what documented provisioning or operating-system enforcement guarantees should an application rely on instead? Is controlled provisioning the intended boundary, or is a different supported Keychain design appropriate? Most importantly, if verifying the exact trusted-application restriction isn't supported, what is Apple's recommended secure approach for allowing a local Python trading application to retrieve Keychain credentials without granting access to every script using the same Python interpreter? A fake-only example using a disposable test Keychain and synthetic generic-password item has been prepared but has not been built or run because full Xcode was unavailable. This is an API-contract question; no runtime failure or ACL attack is claimed, and no assumption is made that published source exactly matches the installed framework.
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Verifying a stored file-based Keychain trusted-application requirement
I'm evaluating a macOS file-based Keychain ACL that should authorize one application identity, defined by an intended code-signing requirement. The application is a shared Python interpreter; I understand that trusting it does not restrict access to an individual script. I read the related Apple Developer Forums discussion, which explains that complete ACL introspection is not supported and that the stored trusted-application code-signing requirement is accessible through SPI rather than public API. My narrower question is whether there is a supported verification operation that does not require exposing that requirement: Given a SecTrustedApplicationRef obtained through SecACLCopyContents, can a public API establish that its stored caller-matching requirement is no broader than the intended application requirement? Confirming that the intended application is accepted would establish only that it matches, not that additional application identities are excluded. I also don't want to assume that CFEqual against a newly created reference, matching paths, or matching SecTrustedApplicationCopyData results proves equivalent authorization. Apple's documentation describes the CopyData result as opaque. If this comparison is unsupported, what documented provisioning or operating-system enforcement guarantees should an application rely on instead? Is controlled provisioning the intended boundary, or is a different supported Keychain design appropriate? Most importantly, if verifying the exact trusted-application restriction isn't supported, what is Apple's recommended secure approach for allowing a local Python trading application to retrieve Keychain credentials without granting access to every script using the same Python interpreter? A fake-only example using a disposable test Keychain and synthetic generic-password item has been prepared but has not been built or run because full Xcode was unavailable. This is an API-contract question; no runtime failure or ACL attack is claimed, and no assumption is made that published source exactly matches the installed framework.
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Is com.apple.security.device.serial supported for new Mac App Store updates?
I’m preparing an update to a native macOS serial logger already distributed through the Mac App Store. The app uses IOSerialBSDClient to enumerate serial ports, opens the selected /dev/cu.* device with open(O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY | O_NONBLOCK), and configures it with termios. On macOS 27.2, open() returns EPERM with App Sandbox enabled and the USB and Bluetooth entitlements present. The same port opens successfully from a process without App Sandbox. I reproduced this with several adapters. Apple’s archived Entitlement Key Reference lists com.apple.security.device.serial and describes adding it manually: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Miscellaneous/Reference/EntitlementKeyReference/Chapters/EnablingAppSandbox.html The macOS 27.2 App Sandbox profile still contains a rule for this entitlement, but I couldn’t find it in the current entitlement documentation or in Xcode 27.2’s Signing & Capabilities editor. Is adding com.apple.security.device.serial manually to the app’s signed entitlements still the supported approach for new Mac App Store updates? Does it require separate approval or provisioning authorization? If this entitlement is no longer supported for Mac App Store submissions, what does Apple recommend for accessing system-provided BSD serial ports with App Sandbox enabled? The app needs to work with ports exposed by both system and third-party drivers and configure them through termios. Would a temporary file access exception for /dev/ be appropriate for this use case?
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SFAuthorizationPluginView returns nil at the active-session lock screen (screensaver unlock), non-MDM
What we're trying to do We ship a Developer-ID authorization plugin (a SecurityAgent AuthorizationPlugin bundle exporting AuthorizationPluginCreate, hosting an SFAuthorizationPluginView subclass) that presents custom credential + MFA UI at macOS authentication surfaces — the Jamf Connect / NoMAD / XCreds pattern. This works correctly at the login window (system.login.console). We now want the same custom UI at the active-session lock screen (screensaver unlock), so a managed user can satisfy an MFA step on unlock — without MDM. We understand Platform SSO is the MDM-based path; we're specifically asking about the non-MDM AuthorizationPlugin path, which Cisco Duo and RSA appear to ship on macOS 14/15. Environment macOS Sonoma 14.8.7 and Sequoia 15.7.7 / 15.7.9, Apple Silicon (arm64). Non-MDM. Standard Developer ID distribution, no configuration profiles. Plugin bundle: Developer ID Application + Hardened Runtime (flags=runtime), satisfies its DR, notarized. Bundle has an empty NSPrincipalClass and no NSMainNibFile; construction follows the NameAndPassword DTS sample exactly (alloc the SFAuthorizationPluginView subclass via -initWithCallbacks:andEngineRef: in MechanismInvoke, then -displayView). Reproduction Install the plugin into /Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins/. Define a custom right (class = evaluate-mechanisms, mechanisms = [ OurPlugin:invoke ]) — we do not replace the screensaver rule. Append that right to the existing rule, keeping use-login-window-ui: system.login.screensaver (class = rule): rule = [ use-login-window-ui, com.example.screensaver-mfa ] (This "append after use-login-window-ui" arming matches what Cisco Duo's installer does — native password unlock runs first, then the appended mechanism runs in the post-password phase.) Lock, then unlock. What we observe Our mechanism is invoked at unlock (MechanismInvoke runs — so the arming is correct; the modern path otherwise never invokes third-party plugins). But inside MechanismInvoke, on the main thread, in SecurityAgentHelper-arm64: host check: AgentPluginViewHelper = PRESENT // we're in the SecurityAgent GUI host probe: callbacks->version = 4, GetHintValue = <ptr> // engine callbacks, unmodified probe: authorize-right PRESENT rc=0 val=system.login.screensaver presenter alloc'd p = 0x0 (nil = 1) // init returns nil -[SFAuthorizationPluginView initWithCallbacks:andEngineRef:] returns nil. Every downstream symptom we'd chased earlier (black screen, spinner, "ViewBridge … Connection invalid") is just a consequence of there being no view object. What we've ruled out Tracing the construction path (-initWithCallbacks:andEngineRef: → -loadPlugin → [AgentPluginViewHelper loadPluginForRight:engineRef:pluginView:]), we've eliminated: Host process — AgentPluginViewHelper is present; we're in SecurityAgent, not authorizationhost (our UI mechanism is non-privileged). The authorize-right hint — present and correct (system.login.screensaver), read straight through callbacks->GetHintValue. Callbacks / engineRef — valid, version == 4, passed through unmodified (same pointer the engine handed us). The nib — no NSMainNibFile set. The right→product mapping — the right maps to the builtin product, whose plugin object constructs unconditionally. That leaves the display_view re-host step, which appears bound to whether this SecurityAgent instance currently has a live, connection-accepting view-hosting session. Our hypothesis: use-login-window-ui completes the native unlock and tears down its view-hosting session, so our appended mechanism runs after teardown → no live host for display_view → the builtin display mechanism's init fails → SFAuthorizationPluginView init returns nil. The experiment that should have fixed it — but didn't The vendor that ships this (Duo) brackets its non-privileged GUI mechanism with a leading privileged mechanism (and a trailing one). A privileged mechanism runs in authorizationhost; we hypothesized the privileged→non-privileged transition makes authd re-activate SecurityAgent and stand up a fresh view-hosting session before the GUI mechanism runs. We mirrored exactly that: [ OurPlugin:precheck,privileged, OurPlugin:invoke, OurPlugin:complete,privileged ] where precheck/complete are no-op privileged mechanisms that just SetResult(allow). The logs confirm the transition happened: precheck ran in authorizationhosthelper, then invoke ran in a freshly spawned SecurityAgentHelper process (so SecurityAgent did re-activate), with AgentPluginViewHelper present and the hint correct — yet SFAuthorizationPluginView init still returned nil. So replicating the vendor's authorizationdb structure is not sufficient. The remaining difference is either an OS precondition that simply isn't met during a locked-session unlock (the agent isn't accepting view-hosting connections in that context), or something in the vendor's bundle/build (entitlements, embedded XPC/frameworks) rather than the authdb wiring. Questions Is presenting a custom SFAuthorizationPluginView at the active-session lock screen a supported scenario for a non-MDM Developer-ID authorization plugin on macOS 14/15? If yes — what is the supported way to ensure a live view-hosting session exists for a mechanism appended to system.login.screensaver after use-login-window-ui? Is the leading-privileged-mechanism pattern intended, or is there a documented right/API we should use? If SFAuthorizationPluginView init returning nil in this context is expected, please confirm and point us to the sanctioned alternative for custom credential UI at screensaver unlock without MDM. Does any of this differ on Managed vs. non-Managed devices, or depend on SIP / FileVault / Secure Enclave state? References Forums 110667 — use-login-window-ui blocks third-party plugins; legacy path invokes them ("not a bug"). Forums 744211, 771114 — SFAuthorizationPluginView / ViewBridge / viewForType: never called at the lock screen on macOS 15. Feedback FB13238136, FB13128730 — third-party plugin at the lock shield; Data-Protection keychain from screensaver context. Sample code: NameAndPassword — our construction shape matches it exactly. I can provide a minimal reproducer bundle and a sysdiagnose + unified-log capture around a failed unlock on request.
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Empty initiatorOrigin in Redirect SSO extension authorization options on macOS 27
In our macOS Redirect SSO extension, initiatorOrigin is empty in the authorization options received in beginAuthorization(with:). The corresponding AppSSOAgent log shows: localhost AppSSOAgent[55733]: (AppSSOUI) [com.apple.AppSSO:SOAgent] -[SOAgent beginAuthorizationWithRequestParameters:completion:] { AuthorizationOptions = { initiatingAction = 0; initiatorOrigin = ""; path = ""; userActionInitiated = 1; };Is this expected behavior for certain SSO requests, or could this indicate an issue in macOS 27?
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Empty initiatorOrigin in Redirect SSO extension authorization options on macOS 27
We are developing a macOS Redirect SSO extension and observing an empty initiatorOrigin in the authorization options received in beginAuthorization(with:). The corresponding AppSSOAgent log shows: localhost AppSSOAgent[55733]: (AppSSOUI) [com.apple.AppSSO:SOAgent] -[SOAgent beginAuthorizationWithRequestParameters:completion:] { AuthorizationOptions = { initiatingAction = 0; initiatorOrigin = ""; path = ""; userActionInitiated = 1; };Is this expected behavior for certain SSO requests, or could this indicate an issue in macOS 27?
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Core Motion timing between Apple Watch and iPhone under required reason 35F9.1
We are developing an Apple Watch and iPhone training app and would like guidance on the required-reason API requirements for sharing a timing relationship between the two apps. On Apple Watch, we record Core Motion samples and read ProcessInfo.processInfo.systemUptime when each sample callback arrives. The paired iPhone uses timing information to analyze sample ordering and freshness. The two values relevant to this question are: Measurement timestamp: CMLogItem.timestamp associated with the Core Motion sample on Apple Watch. Callback observation time: systemUptime read by the Watch app when it receives that sample’s callback. The proposed interval is the callback observation time minus the measurement timestamp, calculated on the Watch. Both endpoints are on the Watch. The iPhone is the intended recipient of the interval; its receipt time is not an endpoint of this calculation. For illustration only, synthetic values of 1,000.000 seconds for the measurement timestamp and 1,000.020 seconds for the callback observation time would produce a proposed interval of 0.020 seconds. These are not real measurements. This arithmetic example does not establish clock compatibility or permission to transmit the result. Apple’s documentation describes CMLogItem.timestamp as seconds since device boot. The System Boot Time required-reason API list includes systemUptime and mach_absolute_time(). Reason 35F9.1 permits certain elapsed-time measurements and includes an exception for elapsed time between events that occurred within the app. Our questions are: Is CMLogItem.timestamp itself covered by the System Boot Time required-reason API category? We do not see this property explicitly included in the published list. Under reason 35F9.1, may the interval between a Core Motion measurement timestamp and the app’s callback observation time be sent from Apple Watch to its paired iPhone for analysis? Specifically, does it qualify for the exception for elapsed time between events that occurred within the app, given that the measurement time comes from Core Motion? If not, is there an approved way to represent this timing relationship while preserving sample ordering and freshness analysis? Which timing information may be transferred, and which approved reason, if any, applies? We are not reporting an Apple API malfunction. We are asking how to implement this use in accordance with the privacy requirements. Our focused local Xcode sample uses synthetic values only. It does not collect real motion data or transmit data between devices.
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Developed an app and run it, now I see autofill (app name) in activity monitor. Please help!
Developed an app and run it, now I see Autofill (app name) in activity monitor. Please help! I am using opensource libraries. My other developed apps does not show autofill (app name) and it uses the same libs. The differences with the 2 is that the one with the problem uses: assimp, and freetype 2. Is this a security risk? I am thinking maybe if i run this app in sudo mode it will autofill and reveal my password to hackers. What is the best way to mitigate this?
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ATT iOS 27.2 EU – Does the 12-month reprompt interval include decisions made before iOS 27.2?
Hello, We are investigating the new annual ATT reprompting behavior introduced in iOS 27.2 for EU users. Apple's documentation states that developers can request ATT authorization again one year after the user's previous choice. However, we would like to clarify how this applies to existing ATT decisions made before iOS 27.2. Questions Previous ATT decisions older than 12 months If a user denied ATT permission in March 2025 on an earlier iOS version and upgrades to iOS 27.2 in November 2026, can the app immediately display the ATT prompt again? Previous ATT decisions less than 12 months old If a user denied ATT permission in June 2026, will the next ATT prompt become available in June 2027, or does the 12-month period start from the installation of iOS 27.2? Historical ATT decision timestamps Does iOS maintain the original timestamp of ATT decisions made on previous iOS versions, or does the new annual reprompting mechanism only track decisions recorded from iOS 27.2 onwards? Reprompt eligibility API Is there any public API that allows developers to determine whether a user is eligible for an ATT reprompt, without actually attempting to display it? Context This is particularly important for existing applications and Consent Management Platforms (CMPs), where we need to coordinate ATT authorization with GDPR consent flows. Understanding whether the 12-month interval applies retroactively to existing ATT decisions would help us implement the new behavior correctly without unnecessarily prompting users or disrupting existing consent flows. Thank you for your clarification
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Security Resources
General: Forums topic: Privacy & Security Apple Platform Security support document Developer > Security Enabling enhanced security for your app documentation article Creating enhanced security helper extensions documentation article Security Audit Thoughts forums post Cryptography: Forums tags: Security, Apple CryptoKit Security framework documentation Apple CryptoKit framework documentation Common Crypto man pages — For the full list of pages, run: % man -k 3cc For more information about man pages, see Reading UNIX Manual Pages. On Cryptographic Key Formats forums post SecItem attributes for keys forums post CryptoCompatibility sample code Keychain: Forums tags: Security Security > Keychain Items documentation TN3137 On Mac keychain APIs and implementations SecItem Fundamentals forums post SecItem Pitfalls and Best Practices forums post Investigating hard-to-reproduce keychain problems forums post App ID Prefix Change and Keychain Access forums post Smart cards and other secure tokens: Forums tag: CryptoTokenKit CryptoTokenKit framework documentation Mac-specific resources: Forums tags: Security Foundation, Security Interface Security Foundation framework documentation Security Interface framework documentation BSD Privilege Escalation on macOS Related: Networking Resources — This covers high-level network security, including HTTPS and TLS. Network Extension Resources — This covers low-level network security, including VPN and content filters. Code Signing Resources Notarisation Resources Trusted Execution Resources — This includes Gatekeeper. App Sandbox Resources Share and Enjoy — Quinn “The Eskimo!” @ Developer Technical Support @ Apple let myEmail = "eskimo" + "1" + "@" + "apple.com"
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Nov ’25
Privacy & Security Resources
General: Forums topic: Privacy & Security Privacy Resources Security Resources Share and Enjoy — Quinn “The Eskimo!” @ Developer Technical Support @ Apple let myEmail = "eskimo" + "1" + "@" + "apple.com"
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1.5k
Activity
Jul ’25
Two-way sync with Apple Calendar from an Expo/React Native app: iCloud CalDAV on the server, or EventKit on the device?
I'm building a family calendar app (Expo SDK 56 + Supabase). I already have two-way Google Calendar sync running server-side: OAuth, a calendar the app creates in the user's account, push notifications plus an incremental sync token, and an outbox for writes going out. Now I need two-way sync with Apple Calendar. A read-only .ics subscription doesn't work for me, because users need to edit on either side. I see two options: A: iCloud CalDAV from my server The user creates an app-specific password at appleid.apple.com and pastes it into the app. The server creates its own calendar (MKCALENDAR) and syncs with sync-collection, using the same outbox/worker I already have for Google. ✅ Works on every platform, including web, and keeps syncing when the app is closed. ❌ The setup is clunky for non-technical parents. ❌ An app-specific password unlocks the whole iCloud account (mail, contacts, every calendar), so I'd be storing a much broader credential than I need. ❌ iCloud doesn't push changes, so I'd have to poll. ❓ Apple doesn't officially support this. B: EventKit on the device (expo-calendar) The phone reads and writes its local calendars (iCloud, Exchange, and on Android whatever is in CalendarContract). ✅ No credentials, the OS permission prompt handles access, and it covers every account on the phone. ❌ Syncs only while the app runs (background fetch on iOS is unreliable). ❌ One user with two devices means two writers. ❌ Needs a native build, and does nothing on web. Questions for anyone who has shipped one of these: Is anyone running iCloud CalDAV with app-specific passwords in production? How do users take the setup, and has Apple ever pushed back or broken it? If you went with EventKit, how did you handle background sync and conflicts across several devices? Is there a third option I'm missing, or a hybrid (for example EventKit on iOS, server sync everywhere else)?
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76
Activity
14h
Authentication-UI refusal for a file-based certificate query on macOS
The guidance in https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/739774 explains the context search list, the kSecMatchSearchList override and continued use of deprecated file-based APIs where that keychain model is required. For a SecItemCopyMatching query using kSecClassCertificate and an explicitly supplied file-based test keychain, what is the supported way to refuse authentication UI rather than allow a prompt? I am considering macOS 26.6.1 with the macOS 27.0 SDK; please clarify applicability to that combination and any relevant application-context restrictions. In particular, which refusal mechanism applies to the file-based path given the deprecation of earlier authentication-UI options? If access would require keychain unlock or authentication UI, is an error guaranteed, or can the query omit items and return success? A public documentation reference and any version limitations would be helpful. This is a contract question for a prospective test; I have not run it or reproduced a problem.
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86
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18h
Supported way to distinguish no extended ACL from ACL retrieval failure for an open file descriptor on macOS
Hello Apple Developer Forums, I am looking for a documented, supported user-space method on macOS to verify that an already-open file or directory has no extended ACL, while distinguishing that state from an unsupported filesystem or an ACL retrieval failure. Environment and observations: macOS 15.7.7 on an Intel Mac; Command Line Tools SDK 15.5. In an isolated synthetic test, acl_get_fd_np(fd, ACL_TYPE_EXTENDED) returned NULL with errno == ENOENT for a newly created regular file and directory with no ACL added by the test. The same API returned an ACL containing one ACE after an ACL was added to a separate synthetic file. An invalid file descriptor returned NULL with errno == EBADF. These are observations on this OS and test filesystem only. I have not interpreted ENOENT as proof of ACL absence, and I have not tested fgetattrlist. I could not establish from the available documentation whether NULL/ENOENT is a guaranteed indication of ACL absence. I also could not establish whether ATTR_CMN_RETURNED_ATTRS and KAUTH_FILESEC_NOACL provide a supported, stable user-space contract when using fgetattrlist. Questions: When acl_get_fd_np(fd, ACL_TYPE_EXTENDED) returns NULL with errno == ENOENT for an existing object, does that reliably mean the object has no extended ACL? Could it instead indicate unsupported or unavailable ACL data? When requesting ATTR_CMN_EXTENDED_SECURITY through fgetattrlist, how can a caller confirm that the attribute was actually returned? Is ATTR_CMN_RETURNED_ATTRS supported for fgetattrlist? How should omitted or unsupported attributes be distinguished from ACL absence? Is KAUTH_FILESEC_NOACL a supported, stable public user-space contract for parsing kauth_filesec returned by fgetattrlist? Under which documented conditions, if any, does it establish ACL absence? Does VOL_CAP_INT_EXTENDED_SECURITY establish only volume capability, or can it help establish per-object ACL absence? What documented result distinguishes an ACL-free object from a filesystem that does not support extended security? What guarantees apply when retrieving ACL information through an already-open descriptor if the pathname is renamed or replaced? Are ACL retrieval and fstat an atomic snapshot, particularly if another process changes the ACL? What supported API and decision procedure would Apple recommend for positively confirming no extended ACL on an already-open file or directory, while treating unsupported, omitted, malformed, and error results as distinct fail-closed outcomes? If this behavior is not covered by a supported public API contract, a clarification of that limitation and a reference to the closest documented API would be very helpful. Thank you.
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55
Activity
23h
Reading Mouse Events with CGEvent tap from a background app in macOS 27.3
WIth macOS 27.3 (beta 2) things have changed quite a bit for security, see Updates to Device Control and Data Access, and Full Disk Access in macOS I have an app which uses what (used to be called) the Privacy & Security / Accessibility permissions in order to receive mouse events in the background to read them and occasionally modify them. The method used: The app checks AXIsProcessTrustedWithOptions to see if it has permission. If it doesn't have permission, it uses the kAXTrustedCheckOptionPrompt option which would open up the privacy & Security / Accessibility pane. Because that process has been a little flakey in macOS, my app has a backup option, where it runs 'open "x-apple.systempreferences:com.apple.settings.PrivacySecurity.extension?Privacy_Accessibility"' and then walks the user through the steps with onscreen instructions. When permission is granted, the app creates a CGEvent tap SessionEvent tap using the HeadInsertEvent option to receive mouse and touch mouse events. See CGEvent.tapCreate In macOS 27.3 beta 2, always returns false using kAXTrustedCheckOptionPrompt fails to do anything open "x-apple.systempreferences:com.apple.settings.PrivacySecurity.extension?Privacy_Accessibility fails to do anything. CGEvent tap fails A few questions: will my third party app be allowed to use CGEventTaps to read mouse and touchpad events? Or has this been cut off completely and only available to first party apps? If it is allowed, how? Has the permission for this moved to a different System Preference pane? is a CGEvent tap the way to do it? I totally understand that security is important, and apps should not have wide-ranging permissions. I'd love to find a way to keep my app running with the minimal permissions needed.
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514
Activity
2d
ATT prompt not shown and status stays notDetermined: how do you handle it?
Hello, our Unity game (iOS/iPadOS) requests App Tracking Transparency on its first scene, before ads are initialized. Background App Review rejected an earlier build under Guideline 2.1(a) for a blank screen on iPad Air 11-inch (M3), iPadOS 27.0. In that build we called requestTrackingAuthorization right at launch and then waited until trackingAuthorizationStatus was no longer .notDetermined. The status never changed, so the app never left the first screen. Current flow (this build was approved) Wait until UIApplication.shared.applicationState == .active and the app has focus. Call requestTrackingAuthorization(completionHandler:) once and wait for the completion handler. If the completion returns .notDetermined, wait about 4 seconds while the app stays active, then call it one more time. Wait until the status is no longer .notDetermined before loading the next scene. There is no timeout. The first scene runs on every cold launch, so if the status is still .notDetermined, the request is made again on the next launch. [ATTrackingManager requestTrackingAuthorizationWithCompletionHandler:^(ATTrackingManagerAuthorizationStatus status) { dispatch_async(dispatch_get_main_queue(), ^{ // store status; Unity polls it on the main thread }); }];We have not been able to reproduce the original problem on our own devices. Questions for those who have shipped apps with ATT How many times do you retry requestTrackingAuthorization, and how long do you wait between attempts? Is there any limit you know of? If the status still stays .notDetermined after retrying, do you let the user continue and treat it as not authorized (no IDFA), or keep waiting? If you wait, how long before you let the user continue? If you continue without tracking, did App Review ever flag that? Any experience or pointers to documentation would be appreciated.
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31
Activity
2d
macOS 27: Accessibility granted via MDM doesn’t cover PostEvent, and leaves a stray TCC managed_overrides row after unenrollment
Our app uses an active CGEventTap (kCGEventTapOptionDefault, mouse down/up events) and relies on the Accessibility permission (Device Control & Data Access). CGEventTapCreate(kCGAnnotatedSessionEventTap, kCGHeadInsertEventTap, kCGEventTapOptionDefault, CGEventMaskBit(kCGEventLeftMouseDown) | CGEventMaskBit(kCGEventLeftMouseUp) | CGEventMaskBit(kCGEventRightMouseDown) | CGEventMaskBit(kCGEventRightMouseUp) | CGEventMaskBit(kCGEventOtherMouseDown) | CGEventMaskBit(kCGEventOtherMouseUp), callback, refcon);On macOS 27.0.1 we see two behaviours when that permission comes from MDM, and we’d like to know whether they’re expected. According to the PrivacyPreferencesPolicyControl.Services documentation, the PPPC Accessibility key is deprecated in macOS 27. It’s replaced by the Privacy → PermissionDefaults setting in the declarative configuration com.apple.configuration.app.settings, and the managed value is a default that the user can change. We tested both the PPPC payload and the DDM configuration. 1. Managed Accessibility grant doesn’t cover PostEvent When the user turns on Accessibility manually in System Settings > Privacy & Security > Accessibility, the event tap works with no further prompts. When Accessibility comes from device management (a PPPC payload or DDM PermissionDefaults): AXIsProcessTrusted() returns true. On the first click through the tap, macOS shows the “control this computer” prompt. tccd adds an access row for kTCCServicePostEvent with auth_value 0 and auth_reason 4. At the same moment, the app’s Accessibility toggle in System Settings switches off. The managed Accessibility row remains auth_value 2, auth_reason 6. After the user accepts the prompt, PostEvent changes to auth_value 2 and the tap works from then on. Questions : Why does a manual Accessibility grant cover an active event tap, while a managed Accessibility default needs a separate PostEvent grant? With PPPC Accessibility deprecated, is DDM Accessibility plus PPPC PostEvent (Allowed) the intended configuration for apps that install active event taps? 2. Stray managed_overrides row after unenrollment On macOS 27, the managed Accessibility value is stored in a new managed_overrides table in /Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db (schema version 36). On macOS 15 and 26, managed grants were kept in MDMOverrides.plist, and this table doesn’t exist there. Steps : Enroll a never-managed Mac in MDM with user-approved enrollment. Install a profile that grants Accessibility to our app. tccd logs ManagedSettings: inserted managed_overrides for kTCCServiceAccessibility:<bundle id> admin_auth_value=2 auth_value=2. The row is written with policy_id NULL, and policies and active_policy stay empty. Remove the MDM profile from System Settings > General > Device Management. What happens: mdmclient removes the MDM profile first. Removing each TCC payload after that fails with : PlugIn: DetermineUninstallFlags [TCCProfileService] Error: Error Domain=NSPOSIXErrorDomain Code=13 "Permission denied" UserInfo={NSLocalizedDescription=The profile must originate from a user-approved MDM server.}The profiles disappear, MDMOverrides.plist is deleted, and profiles status reports no MDM enrollment. The row remains, with auth_value 1, auth_reason 6 (MDM Policy), policy_id NULL, admin_auth_value 2 and flags 480. tccutil reset Accessibility <bundle id> clears flags but doesn’t remove the row. Later permission prompts and System Settings toggles for the app write to this row instead of to access. Why does the row stay after unenrollment? Is there a supported way to clear it?
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237
Activity
2d
No lifecycle notification when entering App Switcher while app remains inactive after Face ID
We use LAContext.evaluatePolicy(.deviceOwnerAuthentication) for a local app lock. On an iPhone 16 Pro running iOS 26.6.2, after authentication succeeds, UIApplication.shared.applicationState can remain .inactive for approximately 2–8 seconds although the app UI is visible. If the user enters the App Switcher during this interval, the app receives no additional willResignActive or didEnterBackground notification. Returning to the app produces only didBecomeActive. This means the app cannot distinguish between: remaining in the app while the Face ID UI finishes dismissing; and entering the App Switcher and returning during the same inactive interval. Reproduction: Run a minimal UIKit app on a physical Face ID device. Call evaluatePolicy(.deviceOwnerAuthentication). Immediately after successful authentication, enter the App Switcher before didBecomeActive. Wait three seconds and return. Is there a supported public API or lifecycle pattern that lets an app lock immediately in this situation without keeping its content covered until didBecomeActive?
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37
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2d
Credential Provider Extension should allow BE=0, BS=0 for device-bound passkeys
In these threads, it was clarified that Credential Provider Extensions must set both Backup Eligible (BE) and Backup State (BS) flags to 1 in authenticator data: https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/745605 https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/787629 However, I'm developing a passkey manager that intentionally stores credentials only on the local device. My implementation uses: kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly for keychain items kSecAttrTokenIDSecureEnclave for private keys No iCloud sync or backup These credentials are, by definition, single-device credentials. According to the WebAuthn specification, they should be represented with BE=0, BS=0. Currently, I'm forced to set BE=1, BS=1 to make the extension work, which misrepresents the actual backup status to relying parties. This is problematic because: Servers using BE/BS flags for security policies will incorrectly classify these as synced passkeys Users who specifically want device-bound credentials for higher security cannot get accurate flag representation Request: Please allow Credential Provider Extensions to return credentials with BE=0, BS=0 for legitimate device-bound passkey implementations. Environment: macOS 26.2 (25C56), Xcode 26.2 (17C52)
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5
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5d
AuthorizationRightSet called from an endpoint security extension fails with -60008
The Mac has managed profiles installed giving the endpoint security process full disk access. Most Macs do not get this error and AuthorizationRightSet works properly. However, one Mac gets the -60008 error and I can't determine the cause. Should an endpoint security extension be able to call AuthorizationRightSet?
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63
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5d
How can a macOS app safely extend and independently verify an existing Keychain item’s ACL and partition list?
I’m investigating a macOS Keychain access-control question involving an existing generic-password item and a separately code-signed application. The requirement is to authorize the application to access the existing item while preserving all previously authorized applications, partition-list entries, and other security restrictions. The item must remain in its existing Keychain. Recreating, replacing, or migrating it is not acceptable. My understanding is that legacy trusted-application ACLs and Keychain partition lists can impose separate restrictions, and that modifying one does not necessarily preserve or satisfy the other. I would appreciate clarification on four questions: Is there a supported macOS API for adding one trusted application to an existing generic-password item’s ACL while preserving all other ACL entries and restrictions? Is there a supported API for modifying an existing item’s partition list without replacing or inadvertently broadening its existing authorization policy? After making these changes, is there a supported method to independently enumerate and verify the complete resulting ACL and partition-list policy, rather than relying solely on a successful access attempt? If complete independent verification is not supported, what approach does Apple recommend for safely extending access to an existing Keychain item without weakening its current protections? The goal is a narrowly scoped, auditable authorization change, not a general relaxation of Keychain security. I’m particularly interested in the distinction between what macOS technically permits and what Apple officially supports for production applications. Thank you for any guidance or relevant documentation.
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117
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1w
Verifying a stored file-based Keychain trusted-application requirement
I'm evaluating a macOS file-based Keychain ACL that should authorize one application identity, defined by an intended code-signing requirement. The application is a shared Python interpreter; I understand that trusting it does not restrict access to an individual script. I read the related Apple Developer Forums discussion, which explains that complete ACL introspection is not supported and that the stored trusted-application code-signing requirement is accessible through SPI rather than public API. My narrower question is whether there is a supported verification operation that does not require exposing that requirement: Given a SecTrustedApplicationRef obtained through SecACLCopyContents, can a public API establish that its stored caller-matching requirement is no broader than the intended application requirement? Confirming that the intended application is accepted would establish only that it matches, not that additional application identities are excluded. I also don't want to assume that CFEqual against a newly created reference, matching paths, or matching SecTrustedApplicationCopyData results proves equivalent authorization. Apple's documentation describes the CopyData result as opaque. If this comparison is unsupported, what documented provisioning or operating-system enforcement guarantees should an application rely on instead? Is controlled provisioning the intended boundary, or is a different supported Keychain design appropriate? Most importantly, if verifying the exact trusted-application restriction isn't supported, what is Apple's recommended secure approach for allowing a local Python trading application to retrieve Keychain credentials without granting access to every script using the same Python interpreter? A fake-only example using a disposable test Keychain and synthetic generic-password item has been prepared but has not been built or run because full Xcode was unavailable. This is an API-contract question; no runtime failure or ACL attack is claimed, and no assumption is made that published source exactly matches the installed framework.
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90
Activity
1w
Verifying a stored file-based Keychain trusted-application requirement
I'm evaluating a macOS file-based Keychain ACL that should authorize one application identity, defined by an intended code-signing requirement. The application is a shared Python interpreter; I understand that trusting it does not restrict access to an individual script. I read the related Apple Developer Forums discussion, which explains that complete ACL introspection is not supported and that the stored trusted-application code-signing requirement is accessible through SPI rather than public API. My narrower question is whether there is a supported verification operation that does not require exposing that requirement: Given a SecTrustedApplicationRef obtained through SecACLCopyContents, can a public API establish that its stored caller-matching requirement is no broader than the intended application requirement? Confirming that the intended application is accepted would establish only that it matches, not that additional application identities are excluded. I also don't want to assume that CFEqual against a newly created reference, matching paths, or matching SecTrustedApplicationCopyData results proves equivalent authorization. Apple's documentation describes the CopyData result as opaque. If this comparison is unsupported, what documented provisioning or operating-system enforcement guarantees should an application rely on instead? Is controlled provisioning the intended boundary, or is a different supported Keychain design appropriate? Most importantly, if verifying the exact trusted-application restriction isn't supported, what is Apple's recommended secure approach for allowing a local Python trading application to retrieve Keychain credentials without granting access to every script using the same Python interpreter? A fake-only example using a disposable test Keychain and synthetic generic-password item has been prepared but has not been built or run because full Xcode was unavailable. This is an API-contract question; no runtime failure or ACL attack is claimed, and no assumption is made that published source exactly matches the installed framework.
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83
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1w
Is com.apple.security.device.serial supported for new Mac App Store updates?
I’m preparing an update to a native macOS serial logger already distributed through the Mac App Store. The app uses IOSerialBSDClient to enumerate serial ports, opens the selected /dev/cu.* device with open(O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY | O_NONBLOCK), and configures it with termios. On macOS 27.2, open() returns EPERM with App Sandbox enabled and the USB and Bluetooth entitlements present. The same port opens successfully from a process without App Sandbox. I reproduced this with several adapters. Apple’s archived Entitlement Key Reference lists com.apple.security.device.serial and describes adding it manually: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Miscellaneous/Reference/EntitlementKeyReference/Chapters/EnablingAppSandbox.html The macOS 27.2 App Sandbox profile still contains a rule for this entitlement, but I couldn’t find it in the current entitlement documentation or in Xcode 27.2’s Signing & Capabilities editor. Is adding com.apple.security.device.serial manually to the app’s signed entitlements still the supported approach for new Mac App Store updates? Does it require separate approval or provisioning authorization? If this entitlement is no longer supported for Mac App Store submissions, what does Apple recommend for accessing system-provided BSD serial ports with App Sandbox enabled? The app needs to work with ports exposed by both system and third-party drivers and configure them through termios. Would a temporary file access exception for /dev/ be appropriate for this use case?
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156
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1w
SFAuthorizationPluginView returns nil at the active-session lock screen (screensaver unlock), non-MDM
What we're trying to do We ship a Developer-ID authorization plugin (a SecurityAgent AuthorizationPlugin bundle exporting AuthorizationPluginCreate, hosting an SFAuthorizationPluginView subclass) that presents custom credential + MFA UI at macOS authentication surfaces — the Jamf Connect / NoMAD / XCreds pattern. This works correctly at the login window (system.login.console). We now want the same custom UI at the active-session lock screen (screensaver unlock), so a managed user can satisfy an MFA step on unlock — without MDM. We understand Platform SSO is the MDM-based path; we're specifically asking about the non-MDM AuthorizationPlugin path, which Cisco Duo and RSA appear to ship on macOS 14/15. Environment macOS Sonoma 14.8.7 and Sequoia 15.7.7 / 15.7.9, Apple Silicon (arm64). Non-MDM. Standard Developer ID distribution, no configuration profiles. Plugin bundle: Developer ID Application + Hardened Runtime (flags=runtime), satisfies its DR, notarized. Bundle has an empty NSPrincipalClass and no NSMainNibFile; construction follows the NameAndPassword DTS sample exactly (alloc the SFAuthorizationPluginView subclass via -initWithCallbacks:andEngineRef: in MechanismInvoke, then -displayView). Reproduction Install the plugin into /Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins/. Define a custom right (class = evaluate-mechanisms, mechanisms = [ OurPlugin:invoke ]) — we do not replace the screensaver rule. Append that right to the existing rule, keeping use-login-window-ui: system.login.screensaver (class = rule): rule = [ use-login-window-ui, com.example.screensaver-mfa ] (This "append after use-login-window-ui" arming matches what Cisco Duo's installer does — native password unlock runs first, then the appended mechanism runs in the post-password phase.) Lock, then unlock. What we observe Our mechanism is invoked at unlock (MechanismInvoke runs — so the arming is correct; the modern path otherwise never invokes third-party plugins). But inside MechanismInvoke, on the main thread, in SecurityAgentHelper-arm64: host check: AgentPluginViewHelper = PRESENT // we're in the SecurityAgent GUI host probe: callbacks->version = 4, GetHintValue = <ptr> // engine callbacks, unmodified probe: authorize-right PRESENT rc=0 val=system.login.screensaver presenter alloc'd p = 0x0 (nil = 1) // init returns nil -[SFAuthorizationPluginView initWithCallbacks:andEngineRef:] returns nil. Every downstream symptom we'd chased earlier (black screen, spinner, "ViewBridge … Connection invalid") is just a consequence of there being no view object. What we've ruled out Tracing the construction path (-initWithCallbacks:andEngineRef: → -loadPlugin → [AgentPluginViewHelper loadPluginForRight:engineRef:pluginView:]), we've eliminated: Host process — AgentPluginViewHelper is present; we're in SecurityAgent, not authorizationhost (our UI mechanism is non-privileged). The authorize-right hint — present and correct (system.login.screensaver), read straight through callbacks->GetHintValue. Callbacks / engineRef — valid, version == 4, passed through unmodified (same pointer the engine handed us). The nib — no NSMainNibFile set. The right→product mapping — the right maps to the builtin product, whose plugin object constructs unconditionally. That leaves the display_view re-host step, which appears bound to whether this SecurityAgent instance currently has a live, connection-accepting view-hosting session. Our hypothesis: use-login-window-ui completes the native unlock and tears down its view-hosting session, so our appended mechanism runs after teardown → no live host for display_view → the builtin display mechanism's init fails → SFAuthorizationPluginView init returns nil. The experiment that should have fixed it — but didn't The vendor that ships this (Duo) brackets its non-privileged GUI mechanism with a leading privileged mechanism (and a trailing one). A privileged mechanism runs in authorizationhost; we hypothesized the privileged→non-privileged transition makes authd re-activate SecurityAgent and stand up a fresh view-hosting session before the GUI mechanism runs. We mirrored exactly that: [ OurPlugin:precheck,privileged, OurPlugin:invoke, OurPlugin:complete,privileged ] where precheck/complete are no-op privileged mechanisms that just SetResult(allow). The logs confirm the transition happened: precheck ran in authorizationhosthelper, then invoke ran in a freshly spawned SecurityAgentHelper process (so SecurityAgent did re-activate), with AgentPluginViewHelper present and the hint correct — yet SFAuthorizationPluginView init still returned nil. So replicating the vendor's authorizationdb structure is not sufficient. The remaining difference is either an OS precondition that simply isn't met during a locked-session unlock (the agent isn't accepting view-hosting connections in that context), or something in the vendor's bundle/build (entitlements, embedded XPC/frameworks) rather than the authdb wiring. Questions Is presenting a custom SFAuthorizationPluginView at the active-session lock screen a supported scenario for a non-MDM Developer-ID authorization plugin on macOS 14/15? If yes — what is the supported way to ensure a live view-hosting session exists for a mechanism appended to system.login.screensaver after use-login-window-ui? Is the leading-privileged-mechanism pattern intended, or is there a documented right/API we should use? If SFAuthorizationPluginView init returning nil in this context is expected, please confirm and point us to the sanctioned alternative for custom credential UI at screensaver unlock without MDM. Does any of this differ on Managed vs. non-Managed devices, or depend on SIP / FileVault / Secure Enclave state? References Forums 110667 — use-login-window-ui blocks third-party plugins; legacy path invokes them ("not a bug"). Forums 744211, 771114 — SFAuthorizationPluginView / ViewBridge / viewForType: never called at the lock screen on macOS 15. Feedback FB13238136, FB13128730 — third-party plugin at the lock shield; Data-Protection keychain from screensaver context. Sample code: NameAndPassword — our construction shape matches it exactly. I can provide a minimal reproducer bundle and a sysdiagnose + unified-log capture around a failed unlock on request.
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94
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Empty initiatorOrigin in Redirect SSO extension authorization options on macOS 27
In our macOS Redirect SSO extension, initiatorOrigin is empty in the authorization options received in beginAuthorization(with:). The corresponding AppSSOAgent log shows: localhost AppSSOAgent[55733]: (AppSSOUI) [com.apple.AppSSO:SOAgent] -[SOAgent beginAuthorizationWithRequestParameters:completion:] { AuthorizationOptions = { initiatingAction = 0; initiatorOrigin = ""; path = ""; userActionInitiated = 1; };Is this expected behavior for certain SSO requests, or could this indicate an issue in macOS 27?
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Empty initiatorOrigin in Redirect SSO extension authorization options on macOS 27
We are developing a macOS Redirect SSO extension and observing an empty initiatorOrigin in the authorization options received in beginAuthorization(with:). The corresponding AppSSOAgent log shows: localhost AppSSOAgent[55733]: (AppSSOUI) [com.apple.AppSSO:SOAgent] -[SOAgent beginAuthorizationWithRequestParameters:completion:] { AuthorizationOptions = { initiatingAction = 0; initiatorOrigin = ""; path = ""; userActionInitiated = 1; };Is this expected behavior for certain SSO requests, or could this indicate an issue in macOS 27?
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Core Motion timing between Apple Watch and iPhone under required reason 35F9.1
We are developing an Apple Watch and iPhone training app and would like guidance on the required-reason API requirements for sharing a timing relationship between the two apps. On Apple Watch, we record Core Motion samples and read ProcessInfo.processInfo.systemUptime when each sample callback arrives. The paired iPhone uses timing information to analyze sample ordering and freshness. The two values relevant to this question are: Measurement timestamp: CMLogItem.timestamp associated with the Core Motion sample on Apple Watch. Callback observation time: systemUptime read by the Watch app when it receives that sample’s callback. The proposed interval is the callback observation time minus the measurement timestamp, calculated on the Watch. Both endpoints are on the Watch. The iPhone is the intended recipient of the interval; its receipt time is not an endpoint of this calculation. For illustration only, synthetic values of 1,000.000 seconds for the measurement timestamp and 1,000.020 seconds for the callback observation time would produce a proposed interval of 0.020 seconds. These are not real measurements. This arithmetic example does not establish clock compatibility or permission to transmit the result. Apple’s documentation describes CMLogItem.timestamp as seconds since device boot. The System Boot Time required-reason API list includes systemUptime and mach_absolute_time(). Reason 35F9.1 permits certain elapsed-time measurements and includes an exception for elapsed time between events that occurred within the app. Our questions are: Is CMLogItem.timestamp itself covered by the System Boot Time required-reason API category? We do not see this property explicitly included in the published list. Under reason 35F9.1, may the interval between a Core Motion measurement timestamp and the app’s callback observation time be sent from Apple Watch to its paired iPhone for analysis? Specifically, does it qualify for the exception for elapsed time between events that occurred within the app, given that the measurement time comes from Core Motion? If not, is there an approved way to represent this timing relationship while preserving sample ordering and freshness analysis? Which timing information may be transferred, and which approved reason, if any, applies? We are not reporting an Apple API malfunction. We are asking how to implement this use in accordance with the privacy requirements. Our focused local Xcode sample uses synthetic values only. It does not collect real motion data or transmit data between devices.
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Developed an app and run it, now I see autofill (app name) in activity monitor. Please help!
Developed an app and run it, now I see Autofill (app name) in activity monitor. Please help! I am using opensource libraries. My other developed apps does not show autofill (app name) and it uses the same libs. The differences with the 2 is that the one with the problem uses: assimp, and freetype 2. Is this a security risk? I am thinking maybe if i run this app in sudo mode it will autofill and reveal my password to hackers. What is the best way to mitigate this?
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ATT iOS 27.2 EU – Does the 12-month reprompt interval include decisions made before iOS 27.2?
Hello, We are investigating the new annual ATT reprompting behavior introduced in iOS 27.2 for EU users. Apple's documentation states that developers can request ATT authorization again one year after the user's previous choice. However, we would like to clarify how this applies to existing ATT decisions made before iOS 27.2. Questions Previous ATT decisions older than 12 months If a user denied ATT permission in March 2025 on an earlier iOS version and upgrades to iOS 27.2 in November 2026, can the app immediately display the ATT prompt again? Previous ATT decisions less than 12 months old If a user denied ATT permission in June 2026, will the next ATT prompt become available in June 2027, or does the 12-month period start from the installation of iOS 27.2? Historical ATT decision timestamps Does iOS maintain the original timestamp of ATT decisions made on previous iOS versions, or does the new annual reprompting mechanism only track decisions recorded from iOS 27.2 onwards? Reprompt eligibility API Is there any public API that allows developers to determine whether a user is eligible for an ATT reprompt, without actually attempting to display it? Context This is particularly important for existing applications and Consent Management Platforms (CMPs), where we need to coordinate ATT authorization with GDPR consent flows. Understanding whether the 12-month interval applies retroactively to existing ATT decisions would help us implement the new behavior correctly without unnecessarily prompting users or disrupting existing consent flows. Thank you for your clarification
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